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“The more things change, the more they remain the same.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
How important is counsel in representing a mentally disordered person 
in a court proceeding to determine whether that person can be subjected 
to involuntary civil commitment or in a court proceeding to determine 
whether psychotropic medication can be administered to a civilly 
committed mental patient over that patient’s objection?  Michael Perlin, 
author of the definitive five volume treatise on mental disability law2
and the foremost authority on the subject, has asserted that the quality of 
counsel is “the single most important factor in the disposition of involuntary 
civil commitment cases”3 and is “of critical importance in the disposition 
of right-to-refuse treatment cases as well.”4
This Article explores how well counsel has performed this function 
historically and whether deficiencies in performance have been eliminated 
over time.  Part II discusses empirical studies of attorney performance in 
civil commitment proceedings conducted in the 1960s and 1970s.  Those 
studies revealed a consistent failure of attorneys to advocate actively for 
their mentally disordered clients in those proceedings.  Although numerous 
commentators have relied upon those studies to denounce attorney 
passivity and to urge attorneys to aggressively resist involuntary civil 
commitment of their clients, inadequate performance by attorneys 
continues to be the rule today, rather than the exception. 
Part III discusses the doctrine of informed consent and its applicability 
to civilly committed mental patients who wish to refuse treatment with 
psychotropic medication.  Scholars have asserted, and numerous courts 
have ruled, that mentally disordered persons, even mentally disordered 
persons who have been involuntarily committed, may, nevertheless, be 
competent to rationally evaluate the treatment proposed for their mental 
1. ALPHONSE KARR, LES GUÊPES (1849), quoted in JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONS: A COLLECTION OF PASSAGES, PHRASES, AND PROVERBS TRACED TO THEIR
SOURCES IN ANCIENT AND MODERN LITERATURE 443 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992).  
Consider also this quotation: “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to 
repeat it.”  GEORGE SANTAYANA, 1 THE LIFE OF REASON (1905–06), quoted in BARTLETT,
supra, at 588. 
2. MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL (2d ed.
1998); see also Virginia Aldige Hiday, Reformed Commitment Procedures: An 
Empirical Study in the Courtroom, 11 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 651, 663 (1977) (reporting that 
when counsel challenged evidence that the proposed patient’s mental condition met the 
criteria for involuntary civil commitment, decisions to civilly commit were significantly 
reduced). 
3. 2 PERLIN, supra note 2, § 3B-11, at 362–63.
4. Id. at 363.
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condition.  If they are competent, their informed consent to treatment 
should be required, just as it is for any other competent patient. 
Although the right of competent mental patients to refuse treatment has 
been articulated and accepted—at least theoretically—almost no 
attention has been devoted to the adequacy of attorneys who represent 
patients in hearings to determine their competency to withhold consent 
to treatment.  If lawyers do not advocate zealously for their mentally 
disordered clients to avoid involuntary civil commitment, one can 
assume they are less likely to advocate zealously for their civilly 
committed, mentally disordered clients who wish to refuse treatment 
prescribed by their doctors that may improve their mental condition 
sufficiently to allow them to be released. 
Part IV discusses civil commitment in California, focusing on mental 
health conservatorhips that are used—almost exclusively—to achieve 
long-term civil commitment of mentally disordered individuals.  In addition 
to permitting the conservator to involuntarily confine the conservatee in 
a mental hospital, the law also allows the conservator to impose 
involuntary treatment on the conservatee—even though the conservatee 
has not been adjudicated incompetent to make treatment decisions. 
Part V discusses an empirical study of attorney performance in 
representing proposed conservatees in conservatorship hearings conducted 
in San Diego in 1975, more than thirty years ago.  As reported in that 
study, the attorneys’ performance was abysmal.  Part V also discusses a 
California Supreme Court case decided one year after the study was 
published.5  In reaching its decision to impose certain stringent due 
process safeguards in the conservatorship hearing process, the court 
relied in part on the results of this early study. 
Part VI reports on a second study of attorney performance in representing 
proposed conservatees in conservatorship hearings conducted in December 
of 2007 and the spring of 2008.  This study attempted to replicate the 
study conducted more than thirty years earlier.  Although there were 
changes in the way hearings were conducted and the qualifications of 
attorneys who represented proposed conservatees, attorney performance 
remained abysmal.  As I observed these hearings, I felt that I had entered 
a time warp—I was transported back to 1975, observing hearings conducted 
5. Conservatorship of Roulet, 590 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1979).
286
in the earlier study.  The words of Yogi Berra came to my mind: “This is 
like déjà vu all over again.”6
Part VII concludes the Article by discussing the changes that must 
occur in order to improve attorney performance.  In 2001, the Montana 
Supreme Court appropriately characterized the ineffective assistance of 
counsel in civil commitment proceedings as a “systemic failure”7 and 
issued practice guidelines to ensure that attorneys perform as vigorous 
advocates safeguarding the rights and liberties of their mentally 
disordered clients.8  I can only hope that the Montana model will be 
emulated nationally, and that it will not take another thirty years for 
passive paternalism to be replaced by zealous advocacy. 
II. THE INADEQUACY OF COUNSEL FOR MENTALLY DISORDERED
PERSONS IN CIVIL COMMITMENT HEARINGS
In 1966, Fred Cohen reported that attorneys representing prospective 
mental patients in civil commitment proceedings performed perfunctorily, 
deferring to the judgment of the psychiatrists who recommended 
commitment.9  In essence, the attorneys viewed their function as 
ceremonial.10  In a study of one day’s activity in Travis County, Texas, 
Professor Cohen found that one attorney was appointed to represent the 
forty patients at the commitment hearings scheduled for that day, that the 
attorney asked no questions of the doctors and offered no evidence to 
controvert their recommendations, and that all forty patients were civilly 
committed for an indefinite period of time and found to be mentally 
incompetent.11  The forty hearings were conducted in a total of seventy-
five minutes.12
In 1970, an investigation of the Iowa civil commitment process 
revealed that “in the normal case appointed counsel makes no pre-
6. QuoteDB, http://www.quotedb.com/quotes/1304 (last visited Apr. 1, 2009).
Déjà vu, which is also known as paramnesia, is defined as “the illusion that one has 
previously had an experience that is actually new to one.”  WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD 
DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 372 (David B. Guralnik ed., 2d college ed. 1970). 
7. In re Mental Health of K.G.F., 29 P.3d 485, 494 (Mont. 2001).
8. Id. at 497–500.
9. Fred Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally
Ill, 44 TEX. L. REV. 424, 424–25 (1966). 
10. Id. at 425.
11. Id. at 427–30.  A far more extensive examination of judicial hearings involving
applications for civil commitment, conducted in St. Louis, Missouri, in the 1960s, 
revealed that the mentally disordered person was not civilly committed in only two of the 
1700 cases studied.  George E. Dix, Acute Psychiatric Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill 
in the Metropolis: An Empirical Study, 1968 WASH. U. L.Q. 485, 540. 
12. Cohen, supra note 9, at 430.  The attorney was compensated at the rate of ten
dollars per case and thus received four hundred dollars for his “efforts.”  Id.
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hearing preparation nor does he meet with his client in advance of the 
day of the hearing.”13  The attorneys were “neither aware of nor concerned 
about their client’s desires.”14  They viewed their function as simply to 
ensure that their client would not be improperly “railroaded” into an 
institution by a person motivated by hostility or vindictiveness.15  Once 
the lawyer concluded that the client was not being “railroaded,” the 
lawyer did not actively defend the client from the state’s exercise of 
power to involuntarily commit the patient.16  Although a criminal defense 
attorney “is not deterred from his goal of preventing a determination that 
his client is criminally responsible . . . [i]n the involuntary hospitalization 
area, however, most attorneys accept the proposition that the expert in 
mental health is better prepared to determine what is in the best interests 
of their client.”17  The authors found that effective decisionmaking power is 
allocated “to the medical profession with the legal process and the attorney 
assuming a ceremonial function.”18
Three years after this study was published, the Iowa Legislature 
enacted comprehensive legislation19 substantially revising the state’s 
civil commitment process.20  In direct response to the problem of inadequate 
legal representation of proposed patients, the 1975 legislation clarified 
that the attorney 
is the primary guarantor of the respondent’s procedural and substantive rights. . . . 
The attorney’s responsibility, in view of these considerations, is to hold the state 
to its burden of proof, and to fully raise all relevant evidence and arguments 
bearing on the respondent’s suitability for involuntary treatment. . . .  Counsel is 
given ample means to serve this role, including continuing rights to notice, 
discovery, independent expert evaluation, presentation of evidence, and cross-
examination.21
13. Note, Contemporary Studies Project: Facts and Fallacies About Iowa Civil
Commitment, 55 IOWA L. REV. 895, 914 (1970) [hereinafter Contemporary Studies Project]. 
14. Id. at 920.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 921.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 922.
19. An Act Relating to Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, ch. 139, 1975 Iowa Acts
350 (codified with subsequent revisions at IOWA CODE ch. 229). 
20. See generally Randall P. Bezanson, Involuntary Treatment of the Mentally Ill
in Iowa: The 1975 Legislation, 61 IOWA L. REV. 261 (1975) (describing, analyzing, and 
interpreting the civil commitment legislation enacted in Iowa in 1975). 
21. Id. at 365–66.
288
Despite this legislative clarification of the attorney’s role, a study of the 
Iowa civil commitment process, published four years after the legislation 
was enacted, revealed that nearly three-fourths of the hearings continued 
to be conducted in a nonadversarial manner.22  Although the decisionmaker 
typically relied upon the physician’s report and examination as the main 
source of evidence, in over 99% of the cases, the attorney representing 
the proposed patient—whether in an adversarial or nonadversarial hearing— 
did not request a second medical opinion.23  Cross-examination of the 
physician who testified for commitment either did not occur or was “of 
doubtful quality.”24  “[W]hen the physician recommends commitment, 
the defense attorney often agrees with the finding instead of following 
the statute and assembling a defense with the many tools that the statute 
provides.”25  The authors of this 1979 study concluded: “At no stage in 
the commitment process have the attorneys consistently fulfilled the 
duties created by the statute. . . .  Instead, the attorneys do little more than 
appear at the hearing and draw their fee.”26
In 1974, David Wexler and Stanley Scoville reported similar results in 
a study of civil commitment hearings in Arizona’s Maricopa and Pima 
Counties.27  Typically, a single attorney was appointed to represent all of 
the indigent individuals in civil commitment cases conducted in one 
day.28  If the attorney believed the individual met the commitment 
criteria, then “[u]nlike a criminal action where an attorney generally 
seems untroubled by zealously seeking his client’s acquittal despite a 
personal belief in the client’s guilt and dangerous character, attorneys 
representing patients in commitment hearings usually do little or nothing 
to obtain the client’s release.”29  Even if the attorney, based on a brief 
interview with the patient, believes that civil commitment is unwarranted, 
the attorney “will usually rely on the psychiatric report more than on his 
own intuitive reaction or the unsupported word of his client.”30  In fact, 
22. Serena D. Stier & Kurt J. Stoebe, Contemporary Studies Project, Involuntary
Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill in Iowa: The Failure of the 1975 Legislation, 64 IOWA
L. REV. 1284, 1344 (1979).
23. Id. at 1347.  Attorney preparation for civil commitment hearings was characterized
as “minimal,” even for adversarial hearings.  Id. at 1350. 
24. Id. at 1348.
25. Id. at 1353.
26. Id. at 1352.
27. See David B. Wexler & Stanley E. Scoville, The Administration of Psychiatric
Justice: Theory and Practice in Arizona, 13 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 32–35, 53–55 (1971). 
28. Id. at 33.  In Maricopa County, appointed counsel were paid ten dollars per
case; in Pima County, appointed counsel were paid five dollars per case.  Id. at 34. 
Eventually, Pima County replaced private attorneys as appointed counsel with the Public 
Defender.  Id.
29. Id. at 35.
30. Id. at 34.
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Wexler and Scoville reported that, in Maricopa County, attorneys not 
only fail to act as advocates resisting the civil commitment of their 
client, but rather, they promote commitment “by virtually presenting the 
case against the patient.”31
In 1974, Elliott Andalman and David Chambers,32 after reviewing the 
previously published studies of civil commitment proceedings in 
Texas,33 Iowa,34 and Arizona,35 asserted that attorneys who “did virtually 
nothing except stand passively at a hearing and add a falsely reassuring 
patina of respectability to the proceedings . . . may in fact worsen the 
client’s chances for release.  The passive attorney may induce the judge 
to believe that she concurs with the judge’s inclination to commit . . . .”36
The failure of counsel to act as adversary counsel—advocating 
actively on behalf of a client to resist involuntary civil commitment—is 
particularly acute among lawyers from the private bar who are appointed 
shortly before the civil commitment hearing.  These lawyers typically 
have inadequate time to prepare, are inadequately compensated for their 
efforts, lack experience in challenging psychiatric judgments, are 
reluctant to appear foolish before the judge, and are uncertain as to their 
31. Id. at 53.
32. Elliott Andalman & David L. Chambers, Effective Counsel for Persons Facing
Civil Commitment: A Survey, a Polemic, and a Proposal, 45 MISS. L.J. 43 (1974). 
33. Id. at 58–59 (discussing civil commitment proceedings in Austin, Texas, as
reported by Cohen, supra note 9, at 427–31, 445, 450). 
34. Id. at 57 (discussing civil commitment proceedings in Iowa, as reported by
Contemporary Studies Project, supra note 13, at 913–23).  Because the Andalman and 
Chambers article was published before the Iowa civil commitment statutes were revised, 
they did not discuss the statutory changes, which were enacted in 1975, or the study of 
attorney performance under the new statutes, which was published in 1979. 
35. Id. at 55–57 (discussing civil commitment proceedings in Phoenix, Arizona, as
reported by Wexler & Scoville, supra note 27, at 32–35, 38–42, 51–60).  Andalman and 
Chambers also reported on their study of civil commitment proceedings in four cities—
New York, Chicago, Cleveland, and Memphis.  Id. at 59–72.  Hearings in the four cities 
were personally observed by Elliott Andalman.  Id. at 54 & n.38.  He also interviewed 
attorneys involved in those hearings.  Id. at 54. 
36. Id. at 72.  In reaching their judgment about the effect of passive attorneys,
Andalman and Chambers also discussed and relied upon civil commitment proceedings 
in Austin, Texas, as reported by Cohen, supra note 9, at 427–31, 445, 450, Iowa, as 
reported by Contemporary Studies Project, supra note 13, at 913–23, and Phoenix, 
Arizona, as reported by Wexler & Scoville, supra note 27, at 32–35, 38–42, 51–60. 
Andalman & Chambers, supra note 32, at 55–59.  But cf. Dennis L. Wenger & C. 
Richard Fletcher, The Effect of Legal Counsel on Admissions to a State Mental Hospital: 
A Confrontation of Professions, 10 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 66, 70 (1969) (reporting 
that in a study of eighty-one civil commitment hearings in Ohio, “[p]atients with legal 
counsel were much less likely to be hospitalized than those without legal counsel”). 
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proper role in the proceeding.37  Nevertheless, in an early study of civil 
commitment hearings conducted at Bellevue Hospital in New York City, 
Thomas Litwack reported that the attorneys in the Mental Health 
Information Service, who work full-time representing patients, only 
“provide forceful representation in cases where they feel the patient 
should and may be released by the court, but they provide weaker 
representation in less hopeful cases.”38  In essence, these lawyers did not 
always advocate for what the client perceived as the client’s self-interest.  
Rather, the lawyers attempted to determine what they perceived as being 
in their client’s best interest, “tacitly decid[ing] how ‘well’ or ‘sick’ a 
particular client is—and how much the client needs hospitalization—and 
then adjust[ing] their efforts at representation accordingly.”39
Over the years, numerous authors have responded to these and other 
early studies40 of attorney performance—or more accurately, 
 37. Thomas R. Litwack, The Role of Counsel in Civil Commitment Proceedings: 
Emerging Problems, 62 CAL. L. REV. 816, 827–31 (1974).  Even when such attorneys 
received specialized training—training on how to aggressively challenge the psychiatric 
expert who testifies for commitment—they “were reluctant to take an adversarial stance, 
even with explicit support by the court.”  Norman G. Poythress, Jr., Psychiatric 
Expertise in Civil Commitment: Training Attorneys to Cope with Expert Testimony, 2 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 17 (1978).  Attorneys continued to take “a more traditional, 
passive, paternal stance toward the proposed patients.”  Id. at 15. 
 38. Litwack, supra note 37, at 832; see also Andalman & Chambers, supra note
32, at 69. 
 39. Litwack, supra note 37, at 832.  Litwack also suggested that even if the Mental 
Health Information Service attorney did not believe that his or her client’s mental 
condition met the statutory criteria for involuntary commitment, the attorney would 
hesitate to argue forcefully before a judge and lose that judge’s respect, if the attorney 
thought that the judge believed that commitment was appropriate in the case.  Thus, if 
the client acted out in court or exhibited delusions of persecution—which might not 
justify commitment under the statute but might well induce a judge to order commitment— 
the attorney would not advocate vigorously that commitment was not warranted.  Id. at 
833; see also Virginia Aldige Hiday, The Attorney’s Role in Involuntary Civil Commitment,
60 N.C. L. REV. 1027, 1036, 1048 (1982) (reporting that in a study of 479 civil 
commitment hearings conducted in North Carolina, not all full-time civil commitment
advocates chose an adversarial role for all cases). 
40. See, e.g., George E. Dix, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill in Wisconsin: A 
Need for a Reexamination, 51 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 33 (1967) (asserting that, in Wisconsin, 
appointed counsel for prospective mental patients evaluate what they perceive to be in 
the best interests of their clients and proceed to accomplish that objective regardless of 
the will of their clients); Virginia Aldige Hiday, The Role of Counsel in Civil Commitment: 
Changes, Effects, and Determinants, 5 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 551, 559 (1977) (finding that 
counsel for the proposed patient assumed an advocate’s role in fewer than half of the 
contested civil commitment cases studied in North Carolina).  “If the role of counsel is to 
protect clients from involuntary confinement in mental institutions . . . then it appears 
that in the majority of contested cases counsel is not functioning as it should.”  Id. at
560; Hiday, supra note 2, at 665 (“[A]ttorneys . . . defer to psychiatric opinion because 
they feel they lack the requisite expertise and want to obtain help for those in need.”); 
Thomas K. Zander, Civil Commitment in Wisconsin: The Impact of Lessard v. Schmidt, 
1976 WIS. L. REV. 503, 528 (finding that counsel for proposed patients do not conduct 
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nonperformance—in civil commitment hearings, by challenging the 
propriety of an attorney-determined, best-interest-of-the-client model of 
representation41 and by asserting that a client-determined, self-interest 
extensive cross-examination of the physicians who recommend involuntary commitment 
and that some trials in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, are completed in five minutes).  
Eighty percent of Wisconsin judges who responded to a survey expressed their belief 
that an attorney representing a proposed patient should act in what the attorney perceives 
as the client’s best interests if the attorney believes that the client is incompetent to make 
a decision regarding the need for hospitalization, even if the attorney is acting contrary to 
the client’s expressed wishes.  Id. at 516. 
 41. A chronological listing of some of these books and articles includes, but is not 
limited to, the following: RONALD S. ROCK, MARCUS A. JACOBSON & RICHARD M.
JANOPAUL, HOSPITALIZATION AND DISCHARGE OF THE MENTALLY ILL 160 (1968) (“[T]he 
actual performance of defense counsel in hearing after hearing is substantially empty, 
mere pretense at the work of an advocate who has no real work cut out for him.”); 
Developments in the Law—Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1190, 1288 (1974) (“[C]ounsel often functions as no more than a clerk, ratifying the 
events that transpire rather than influencing them.”); Mark Alan Hart, Note, Civil 
Commitment of the Mentally Ill in California: The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, 7 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 93, 131 (1974) (“The role attorneys actually play in the commitment 
hearing is indeed disturbing.”); CAROL A.B. WARREN, THE COURT OF LAST RESORT 140 
(1982) (“[A]ttorneys view their clients as crazy and therefore refrain from standing 
firmly in the way of their involuntary incarceration.”); Natalie Wolf, Note, The Ethical 
Dilemmas Faced by Attorneys Representing the Mentally Ill in Civil Commitment 
Proceedings, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 163, 173 (1992) (“Attorneys who assume a 
guardian role in the civil commitment process frequently conduct their representation of 
the allegedly mentally ill individual in disregard of traditional representation obligations 
and in violation of the standards of professional responsibility.”); Bruce J. Winick, 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Commitment Hearing, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 37, 41 (1999) (asserting that attorneys who adopt a paternalistic role in 
representing their clients in civil commitment hearings have “turned the adversarial 
model into a farce and a mockery in which procedural rights are accorded in only a 
formal way so as to effectuate what judges, lawyers, and clinicians perceive to be the 
best interests of the patient”).  Winick characterized such civil commitment hearings as 
“phony rituals” that “may actually produce feelings of worthlessness and loss of dignity, 
exacerbating the person’s mental illness and perhaps even fostering a form of learned 
helplessness that can further diminish performance, motivation, and mood in ways that 
can be antitherapeutic.”  Id. at 45; Donald H. Stone, Giving a Voice to the Silent 
Mentally Ill Client: An Empirical Study of the Role of Counsel in the Civil Commitment 
Hearing, 70 UMKC L. REV. 603, 608 (2002) (“When the hospital presenter and the 
client’s attorney speak in one voice, in which the doctor knows best and one is to ask no 
questions, truth is compromised.  The medical model, as opposed to the legal model, has 
no proper place in the civil commitment arena.”); James B. (Jim) Gottstein, Involuntary 
Commitment and Forced Psychiatric Drugging in the Trial Courts: Rights Violations as 
a Matter of Course, 25 ALASKA L. REV. 51, 104 (2008) (“By abandoning the traditional 
adversarial approach in favor of a paternalistic one—where . . . the lawyers assigned to 
represent psychiatric respondents assume what the State wants to do to psychiatric 
respondents is in their best interest—the State’s proposed actions are not subjected to the 
normal litigation crucible.”). 
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model of representation should be employed.42  Such a change is necessary 
to replace attorney passivity with zealous advocacy.  Despite this critical 
commentary, however, passive paternalism perseveres.  Michael Perlin, 
a frequent critic of attorney performance in civil commitment cases,43
42. A chronological listing of some of these books and articles includes, but is not 
limited to, the following: Hart, supra note 41, at 133–34 (“The attorney must force the 
persons who are trying to commit the client to prove their case, as that term is 
understood in other proceedings, or one is simply not fulfilling necessary obligations to 
the client; instead of representing them, the lawyer has become a mere adjunct to the 
client’s adversaries.”); Note, The Role of Counsel in the Civil Commitment Process: A 
Theoretical Framework, 84 YALE L.J. 1540, 1563 (1975) (“If hearings are to be 
meaningful procedures designed to arrive at fair dispositions based on a full presentation 
of the facts, the lawyer must act as an adversary.  Otherwise, the idea that due process is 
being accorded the mentally ill individual will stand as little more than pretense.”); 
James R. Elkins, Legal Representation of the Mentally Ill, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 157, 185 
(1979) (“Unquestioned deference by the judicial decisionmaker to the psychiatrist must 
be overcome through a defense which encourages the decisionmaker to focus on the 
limitations and contradictions in the expert’s testimony.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 232 
(“The lawyer, to fully represent the patient, must proceed as an advocate.”); WARREN,
supra note 41, at 153 (“In Metropolitan Court, what makes justice seem to the 
nonparticipant audience not to be done is the obvious lack of correspondence between 
what trials are supposed to seem like and what they actually are.”); Steven J. Schwartz et 
al., Protecting the Rights and Enhancing the Dignity of People with Mental Disabilities: 
Standards for Effective Legal Advocacy, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 541, 568 (1983) (“[T]he 
proper role of legal advocacy for persons with disabilities must focus on the vindication 
of individual legal rights.  Legal advocacy provides the only countervailing force to the 
medical and social authority that otherwise completely controls the lives of handicapped 
persons.”); Wolf, supra note 41, at 180 (“If attorneys impose their own judgments they 
defeat the purpose of the hearing and jeopardize the validity of the system.”); Jan C. 
Costello, “Why Would I Need a Lawyer?” Legal Counsel and Advocacy for People with 
Mental Disabilities, in LAW, MENTAL HEALTH, AND MENTAL DISORDER 15, 27 (Bruce D. 
Sales & Daniel W. Shuman eds., 1996) (asserting that a best interest approach “is 
fundamentally at odds with the principles underlying the Model Code [of Professional 
Responsibility] and Model Rules [of Professional Conduct] and was explicitly rejected 
by both judges and legislatures before the Model Rules were drafted”); Stone, supra note 
41, at 614 (“The attorney’s role is to challenge the basis of the application for 
involuntary admission and elicit facts and opinions challenging the need for 
hospitalization.” (footnote omitted)); Phyllis Coleman & Ronald A. Shellow, Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel: A Call for a Stricter Test in Civil Commitments, 27 J. LEGAL 
PROF. 37, 40–41 (2002) (“Because lawyers have the same ethical obligations to 
[mentally disordered] clients as to any other, one easy way to improve the system is for 
attorneys to always perform their role of advocate.” (footnote omitted));  Gottstein, supra 
note 41, at 93 (“By engaging in the traditional adversarial process, the courts—and 
especially the lawyers representing psychiatric respondents—will be the instruments of 
justice they should be . . . .”); see also 1 PERLIN, supra note 2, § 2B-10.1, at 251 n.434 (citing 
several additional law review articles favoring an advocacy approach to representation of 
clients in civil commitment hearings rather than a best interests approach). 
 43. Michael L. Perlin & Robert L. Sadoff, Ethical Issues in the Representation of 
Individuals in the Commitment Process, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 164 (Summer 
1982) (asserting that the record of counsel providing services to mentally ill clients has 
never lived up to the standard of ardent defender of the client’s rights and freedoms).  
“Lawyers who believe that ‘we have no choice but to trust the psychiatrist,’ or who 
disregard their clients’ position because ‘they’re sick’ simply do not meet sixth amendment 
due process standards.”  Id. at 176 (footnotes omitted).  “[P]ersons facing involuntary 
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recently noted that, historically, the promise of counsel has been little 
more than an illusion.44  “And so it remains today.  The quality of counsel 
assigned to represent individuals who face involuntary civil commitment 
to psychiatric hospitals is, in most United States jurisdictions, mediocre 
or worse.”45
III. THE INADEQUACY OF COUNSEL FOR MENTALLY                       
DISORDERED PERSONS IN HEARINGS TO IMPOSE                                                       
INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT
The doctrine of informed consent imposes a duty on physicians to 
disclose to the patient the risks and benefits of, and the alternatives to, 
the proposed treatment and to accept the patient’s decision to authorize 
or refuse that treatment.  In Canterbury v. Spence,46 the leading case on 
the doctrine, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit declared: “[I]t is the prerogative of the patient, not the 
physician, to determine for himself the direction in which his interests 
seem to lie.”47  Therefore, “the patient’s right of self-decision shapes the 
boundaries of the duty to reveal.”48  The adequacy of the physician’s 
disclosures to the patient “must be measured by the patient’s need, and 
that need is the information material to the decision.  Thus the test for 
determining whether a particular peril must be divulged is its materiality 
civil commitment—and the concomitant loss of liberty—have a right to the same 
‘traditional, adversarial, partisan’ counsel that ‘is the hallmark of the American judicial 
system.’”  Id. at 180 (footnotes omitted); see also Michael L. Perlin, Fatal 
Assumption: A Critical Evaluation of the Role of Counsel in Mental Disability Cases, 16 
LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 39, 43 (1992) (“The record of the legal profession in providing 
meaningful advocacy services to mentally disabled persons has been grossly 
inadequate.”).  “[T]here is little reason to be optimistic about the likelihood of universal 
invigorated private representation of this population in the near future.”  Id. at 45; 1 
PERLIN, supra note 2, § 2B-8, at 227–28 (asserting that in representing mentally disabled 
persons in matters affecting their hospitalization, counsel’s performance historically has 
been inadequate, and courts have passively accepted this inadequacy, ignoring specific 
ethical problems arising in such representation). 
 44. Michael L. Perlin, “I Might Need a Good Lawyer, Could Be Your Funeral, My 
Trial”: Global Clinical Legal Education and the Right to Counsel in Civil Commitment 
Cases, 28 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 241, 242 (2008). 
45. Id. at 243.  Professor Perlin added, “If there has been any constant in modern 
mental disability law in its thirty-five-year history, it is the near-universal reality that 
counsel assigned to represent individuals at involuntary civil commitment cases is likely 
to be ineffective.”  Id. at 241 (footnote omitted).
 46. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
47. Id. at 781. 
48. Id. at 786. 
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to the patient’s decision: all risks potentially affecting the decision must 
be unmasked.”49
Courts, however, recognize exceptions to patient autonomous judgment.  
If, for example, the patient is unconscious or in such pain that he or she 
is incapable of considering information about the proposed treatment or 
making a decision as to whether to consent, and if treatment is 
immediately necessary to prevent either death or a serious injury to the 
patient, the physician is privileged to proceed in order to prevent that 
disastrous consequence.50 In this emergency situation, the law presumes, 
in the absence of information to the contrary, that the patient would 
consent to treatment.51
Even in nonemergency situations, courts recognize an exception to the 
informed consent requirement for incompetent persons.52  If an individual 
has been adjudicated incompetent and a guardian has been appointed to 
make personal53 decisions for that individual, the guardian may give 
informed consent to medical treatment as the incompetent ward’s 
substitute decisionmaker.  Even without a court adjudication of incompetence, 
minor children are conclusively presumed to be incompetent, and their 
parents, as their legal guardians, may give informed consent to medical 
treatment for them.54
49. Id. at 786–87 (footnote omitted).  Other courts have articulated the patient’s 
right to medical self-determination in similar terms.  See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 
1, 10 (Cal. 1972) (“The weighing of [the] risks [inherent in the procedure and the risks of 
a decision not to undergo the treatment] against the individual subjective fears and hopes 
of the patient is not an expert skill.  Such evaluation and decision is a nonmedical 
judgment reserved to the patient alone.”). 
50. See Alan Meisel, The “Exceptions” to the Informed Consent Doctrine: 
Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 WIS. L.
REV. 413, 434–38 (discussing the emergency exception). 
 51. Meisel notes that the patient’s implied consent to emergency treatment is 
premised on the presumption that a reasonable person would consent to emergency 
treatment and therefore that this patient would also consent.  Id. at 434.  Meisel suggests 
that such reasoning is “not so much a rationale as it is a restatement of the exception.”  Id.
52. See id. at 439–53 (discussing the incompetency exception). 
 53. Traditionally, a guardian is appointed for either the person or the estate of the 
incompetent person.  A guardian of the person is authorized to make personal decisions 
for the incompetent person, including providing for basic necessities of life, such as 
food, clothing, and housing as well as deciding whether to consent to medical treatment.  
A guardian of the estate is authorized to make decisions concerning the property of the 
incompetent person.  Sometimes a guardian is appointed for both the person and the 
estate of the incompetent person. 
54. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1972) (declaring that if the 
patient is a minor, “the authority to consent is transferred to the patient’s legal 
guardian”).  Courts have also recognized a therapeutic exception to the duty to disclose.  
See Meisel, supra note 50, at 460–70.  If the disclosure would harm the patient, the 
physician is not required to inflict such harm by making the disclosure.  For example, the 
Canterbury court stated that a physician may withhold information if the patient would 
“become so ill or emotionally distraught on disclosure as to foreclose a rational decision, 
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The first court decision to fully recognize a mental patient’s right to 
medical self-determination was Rogers v. Okin,55 decided by a federal 
district court in 1979.  District Judge Joseph Tauro ruled that involuntarily 
confined mental patients—just as any other patients—have a right to 
make decisions about their treatment56 and may not be forcibly medicated.57
Just as with other patients, this right is not absolute, and the patient’s 
informed consent is not required in an emergency or if the patient is 
incompetent.  If no emergency exists justifying treatment, the involuntarily 
committed mental patient—just as any other patient—has a right to 
make his or her own analysis of the risks and benefits of, and 
alternatives to, the proposed treatment that the physician is required to 
communicate to the patient, and to make his or her own decision to 
accept or reject that treatment.58
The judge refused to equate the decision to involuntarily commit a 
person with an adjudication of incompetence:59
The weight of evidence persuades this court that, although committed mental 
patients do suffer at least some impairment of their relationship to reality, most 
are able to appreciate the benefits, risks, and discomfort that may reasonably be 
or complicate or hinder the treatment, or perhaps even pose psychological damage to the 
patient.”  Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789.  The Canterbury court cautioned, however, that the 
therapeutic privilege must be “carefully circumscribed” so that it does not “devour the 
disclosure rule itself.” Id. The court specifically rejected the paternalistic notion that the 
physician may avoid disclosure simply because the physician thinks that the patient, 
upon such disclosure, might reject the proposed treatment that the physician believes is 
medically needed.  Id.
 55. 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 634 F.2d 
650 (1st Cir. 1980), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), 
on remand sub nom. Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984). 
56. Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1366. 
57. Id. at 1371. 
58. Id. at 1367.  Judge Tauro noted that establishing a therapeutic alliance between 
psychiatrist and patient is fundamental for successful treatment.  Such an alliance 
requires the patient to understand and willingly accept the prescribed treatment.  Id. at
1361.  The judge noted that the American Psychiatric Association accepts the requirement 
that informed consent for treatment be obtained from the mental patient except in 
emergency situations.  Id. at 1370 n.37 (citing American Psychiatric Association Task 
Force on the Right to Treatment, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 3 (1977)).  The quoted material 
from the American Psychiatric Association Task Force is actually located at 134 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 355 (1977). 
59. Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1359.  In so ruling, Judge Tauro relied on a Department of 
Mental Health regulation, codified in substance in a state statute, which provides that no 
person admitted to or committed to a mental health facility shall lose the right to manage 
his affairs, to contract, to hold a driver’s license, to make a will, to marry, to hold or 
convey property, or to vote unless the person has been adjudicated incompetent.  Id.  See
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 24 (West 2003). 
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expected from receiving psychotropic medication.  This is particularly true for 
patients who have experienced such medication and, therefore, have some basis 
for assessing comparative advantages and disadvantages.60
The presumption that the patient is competent to make medication decisions 
prevails, said the court, unless the patient has been adjudicated incompetent 
by a court after a hearing on that issue.61  Although the state has an 
obligation to make treatment available to involuntary patients, the state’s 
interest in providing that treatment does not override the competent 
patient’s fundamental right to refuse treatment in nonemergency situations.62
Judge Tauro’s refusal to equate the decision to civilly commit a person 
with a finding of incompetence is logical.  In most states, the commitment 
laws do not presume or require incompetence as a criterion for civil 
commitment.63  Merely because the person has been found to be 
mentally disordered and dangerous to self or others, or unable to provide 
for basic necessities—the typical criteria for commitment64—does not 
60. Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1361. 
 61. Id. The court scoffed at the defendant’s argument that a person who was 
statutorily presumed to be competent to manage his or her affairs and dispose of his or 
her property might not be presumed competent to decide whether to follow his or her 
doctor’s advice regarding medication.  “Such an argument would make a doubter of even 
the most credulous.”  Id. at 1361 n.12.  Although the rights to hold and dispose of one’s 
property are fundamental to any concept of ordered liberty, such rights “pale in 
comparison to the intimate decision as to whether to accept or refuse psychotropic 
medication—medication that may or may not make the patient better, and that may or 
may not cause unpleasant and unwanted side effects.”  Id. at 1366.  Judge Tauro also 
rejected the therapeutic exception to informed consent.  Even if disclosure of potential 
side effects of medication might frighten the patient and therefore might be considered as 
“not [] in the patient’s best interest,” failure to provide the patient with sufficient 
information to make an informed treatment decision is not justified.  Id. at 1387. 
62. Id. at 1367, 1370. 
 63. See Catherine E. Blackburn, The “Therapeutic Orgy” and the “Right to Rot” 
Collide: The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs Under State Law, 27 HOUS. L. REV.
447, 472 n.88 (1990), for statutes declaring that civil commitment neither raises a 
presumption of, nor constitutes a finding of, the patient’s incompetence.  See also Dennis 
E. Cichon, The Right to “Just Say No”: A History and Analysis of the Right to Refuse 
Antipsychotic Drugs, 53 LA. L. REV. 283, 350 n.435 (1992), for court decisions separating the 
commitment and competence issues.  As the Alabama Supreme Court stated: “[A] 
person involuntarily committed to a mental hospital is not ipso facto barred from the 
invocation of the ‘informed consent’ doctrine.”  Nolen v. Peterson, 544 So. 2d 863, 867 
(Ala. 1989).  As of 1985, only eight states even allowed the issues of civil commitment 
and competency to be determined in the same proceeding.  John Parry, Incompetency, 
Guardianship, and Restoration, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED 
AND THE LAW 369, 374 n.35, 405–07 (3d ed. 1985). 
64. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West 1998) (authorizing detention, 
without court order, for seventy-two hours to evaluate and treat mentally disordered 
persons who are a danger to self or others or gravely disabled); id. § 5200 (authorizing 
court-ordered detention for seventy-two hours to evaluate and treat persons who are a 
danger to self or others or gravely disabled); id. § 5250 (authorizing certification for 
fourteen days of intensive treatment for persons who are a danger to self or others or 
gravely disabled); id. § 5260 (authorizing certification for an additional fourteen days of 
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mean that the person is unable to understand the risks, benefits, and 
alternatives to the medication that the physician is prescribing to treat his 
or her condition.  A mentally disordered person’s dangerousness or inability 
to provide for basic necessities may justify a deprivation of liberty, but 
without a separate determination of incompetence, such condition does 
not justify depriving a patient of the right to refuse treatment and 
substituting another’s judgment for that of the patient.65
When the Rogers case was appealed,66 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit held that Massachusetts recognized substantive 
and procedural rights for involuntary mental patients that created for 
them a liberty interest protected under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause.67  Under Massachusetts law, the involuntary commitment 
decision is not a determination that the committed person is incompetent 
intensive treatment for imminently suicidal persons); id. § 5300 (authorizing postcertification 
for a 180-day detention for persons who present a demonstrated danger of inflicting 
substantial physical harm upon others). 
65. See, e.g., In re L.A., 912 A.2d 977, 980–81 (Vt. 2006) (holding that the 
standard for determining incompetence to refuse medication is different and more 
difficult to establish than the standard to determine involuntary commitment, and the 
mere fact that the patient refuses a medication that might be beneficial does not establish 
the patient’s incompetence to do so); In re Virgil D., 524 N.W.2d 894, 898 (Wis. 1994) 
(holding that, under the Wisconsin statute, the only standard applied to evaluate a 
patient’s competency to refuse medication is “whether the patient is able to express an 
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of, and the alternatives to, accepting 
medication or treatment”). 
 66. Following Judge Tauro’s decision, the Rogers case experienced a legal 
odyssey.  The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the judgment 
in part and reversed in part, Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980); the United 
States Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the First Circuit for a determination of 
whether a case decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, In re Guardianship 
of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 1981), while certiorari was pending in Rogers, could
determine the rights and duties of the parties entirely under state law, Mills v. Rogers, 
457 U.S. 291, 305–06 (1982).  The First Circuit certified nine questions of state law to 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. See Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 
1984).  The Massachusetts court provided detailed answers to those questions.  Rogers v. 
Comm’r of Dep’t of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308, 312–23 (Mass. 1983).  The 
questions certified by the First Circuit to the Massachusetts Supreme Court and answered 
by that court appear at Rogers, 458 N.E.2d at 312 n.8 (questions 1 through 3), 315 n.13 
(questions 4 and 5), 319 n.23 (questions 6 and 7), 322 n.27 (questions 8 and 9).  The 
First Circuit relied upon those answers in rendering its decision.  Specifically, the First 
Circuit concluded that “the full panoply of rights set forth [by the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court in Rogers, 458 N.E.2d at 319–20] . . . equal or exceed the rights 
provided in the federal Constitution.”  Rogers, 738 F.2d at 9 (citation omitted). 
67. Rogers, 738 F.2d at 9. 
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to make treatment decisions.68  Thus, the patient retains the right to make 
treatment decisions unless and until a judge adjudicates the patient 
incompetent to make treatment decisions in proceedings to establish the 
patient’s incompetence.69
In many states, the highest appellate courts have adopted right to 
refuse treatment  principles substantially identical to those announced in 
the Rogers case by Judge Tauro in his 1979 district court decision or by 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts four years later.70  The 
68. Rogers, 458 N.E.2d at 312–14.  The court noted that the standard for involuntary 
commitment, that is, that the person is mentally ill and that the failure to commit would 
create a likelihood of serious harm, is a commitment “for public safety purposes and 
does not reflect lack of judgmental capacity.  [The commitment standard] says nothing 
concerning [the patient’s] competence to make treatment decisions.”  Id. at 313. 
69. Id. at 314.  The court rejected the argument that doctors should be able to make 
treatment decisions for involuntarily committed mental patients, even if such patients are 
competent.  Competent adults have the right to refuse treatment even if the medical 
profession views their sense of values as unwise.  Id. (quoting Harnish v. Children’s 
Hosp. Med. Ctr., 439 N.E.2d 240, 242 (Mass. 1982)).  The right to refuse treatment has 
constitutional and common law origins that protect the individual’s “strong interest in 
being free from nonconsensual invasion of his bodily integrity.” Id. (quoting 
Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (Mass. 
1977)). The state’s police power may be used to override a patient’s refusal of 
medication only in an emergency situation in which the “patient poses an imminent 
threat of harm to himself or others, and only if there is no less intrusive alternative to 
antipsychotic drugs.”  Id. at 321.  The court, quoting In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 
N.E.2d 40, 55 (Mass. 1981) noted that when such an emergency situation arises, “even 
the smallest of avoidable delays would be intolerable.”  Rogers, 458 N.E.2d at 322. 
Even if the patient is adjudicated incompetent, treatment may not be imposed unless a 
judge, making a substituted judgment decision for the patient, decides that the patient 
would have consented to the treatment if he or she was competent to make the decision.  
Rogers, 458 N.E.2d at 315–16.  According to the court, the right to refuse medical 
treatment extends to incompetent as well as competent patients because both are entitled 
to human dignity.  Id. at 315 (quoting Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 427).  The court rejected 
decisionmaking determined by what doctors perceive as the patient’s best medical 
interest.  Because the patient bears the risks of treatment, treatment decisions are solely 
the prerogative of the patient—even for incompetent patients.  Rogers, 458 N.E.2d at 
316.  The state’s parens patriae power may be used to override a patient’s refusal of 
medication only in those rare circumstances in which such medication is necessary to 
prevent the “immediate, substantial, and irreversible deterioration of a serious mental 
illness.”  Id. at 322 (quoting Roe, 421 N.E.2d at 55). 
70. See, e.g., Goedecke v. State Dep’t of Insts., 603 P.2d 123, 125 (Colo. 1979) 
(relying on the patient’s common law right to give or withhold informed consent to 
medical treatment and a statute, commonly found in many states, declaring that mental 
patients do not forfeit any legal rights solely by reason of their involuntary commitment); 
People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 971 (Colo. 1985) (citing the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts’s decision in Rogers, and specifically extending the prohibition against 
forced treatment to incompetent mental patients); Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 
144–45, 148 (Minn. 1988) (ruling that the involuntary administration of psychotropic 
medication is “intrusive” treatment that seriously infringes upon the mental patient’s 
right to privacy protected by the state constitution and that involuntary commitment does 
not eliminate this fundamental right to the integrity of one’s own body and to consent—
or withhold consent—to invasions or alterations of one’s own body); Rivers v. Katz, 495 
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authors of a leading coursebook on mental health law report that “virtually 
every court that has considered the matter now recognizes a ‘right to 
refuse’ psychotropic medication for institutionalized populations, in the 
process constitutionalizing a version of the informed consent doctrine in 
that context.”71
In Washington v. Harper,72 the United States Supreme Court ruled that 
mentally ill, sentence-serving prisoners possess “a significant liberty interest 
in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs.”73 If 
mentally ill prisoners have a right to refuse treatment, mentally ill 
nonprisoners surely do.  In fact, because civilly committed patients have 
been confined without a criminal trial and without a criminal conviction, 
N.E.2d 337, 341 (N.Y. 1986) (holding that the fundamental common law right of a 
competent individual to make decisions concerning the individual’s own body “extends 
equally to mentally ill persons who are not to be treated as persons of lesser status or 
dignity because of their illness”); id. at 341–42 (ruling that neither the presence of 
mental illness nor a decision to involuntarily commit the mentally ill person is sufficient, 
in and of itself, to conclude that the person lacks the mental capacity to comprehend the 
consequences of a decision to refuse medication); In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 749, 751 
(Okla. 1980) (superseded by repeal of statute and subsequent legislation) (relying on the 
constitutional right to privacy to uphold an involuntary mental patient’s right to refuse 
treatment); State ex rel. Jones v. Gerhardstein, 416 N.W.2d 883, 892–94 (Wis. 1987) 
(superseded by repeal of statute and subsequent legislation) (relying on the Equal 
Protection Clause of the state and federal constitutions, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
upheld the right of an involuntary mental patient to refuse treatment); id. at 894 
(clarifying that although a finding of dangerousness is a prerequisite for involuntary 
commitment, that finding does not establish the incompetence of the patient to accept or 
refuse psychotropic medication). 
 71. RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL ASPECTS 923 (4th ed. 2004); see also Michael L. Perlin, “May You Stay 
Forever Young”: Robert Sadoff and the History of Mental Disability Law, 33 J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 236, 242 (2005) (asserting that after the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), “every state high court that has 
considered [the question of whether a civilly committed mental patient has a right to 
refuse treatment] has ruled that there is such a right”). 
 72. 494 U.S. 210 (1990). 
73. Id. at 221.  The Court specifically identified a state administrative policy and 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the sources of that liberty 
interest.  Id. at 221–22.  The Court, however, did not require a judicial determination that 
the prisoner was incompetent to make treatment decisions in order to subject him or her 
to involuntary treatment.  Id. at 222, 228.  In the Court’s judgment, mentally ill prisoners 
could be distinguished from civilly committed patients.  For prisoners, the state’s 
legitimate interest in prison safety and security warranted involuntary treatment of those 
mentally disordered prisoners who were dangerous to themselves or others without the 
requirement of a full court hearing.  Id. at 225; see GRANT H. MORRIS, REFUSING THE 
RIGHT TO REFUSE: COERCED TREATMENT OF MENTALLY DISORDERED PERSONS 78–86 
(2006) (discussing and critiquing Harper).
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their decisions to refuse treatment are entitled to special deference.  The 
state has exercised its authority to detain them because of their predicted 
dangerousness or inability to provide for themselves.  The state’s legitimate 
interest in protecting them, and in protecting others from them, is 
achieved by the confinement itself—without coerced treatment.  If the 
confined individual competently chooses to refuse treatment, even if that 
decision may prolong his or her confinement, the individual’s constitutionally 
protected liberty interest in refusing treatment should outweigh any 
claimed governmental interest in coercing treatment.  Michael Perlin, 
citing Harper and two other Supreme Court decisions,74 asserts that the 
Court has clearly recognized a qualified right to refuse treatment in the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.75
Although the development of a mental patient’s right to refuse 
treatment has been a popular subject for legal scholars,76 virtually 
nothing has been written about the role of and adequacy of counsel in 
representing mentally disordered patients who assert that right.  Although 
Michael Perlin devotes a 102-page unit of his Mental Disability Law 
treatise to the role of counsel in civil commitment proceedings,77 he 
devotes only three pages to the role of counsel in right to refuse 
treatment proceedings.78  Professor Perlin cites only one article that 
 74. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992) (holding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits the forcing of antipsychotic medication on criminal defendants 
held for trial “absent a finding of overriding justification and a determination of medical 
appropriateness”); Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 178–83 (2003) (discussing and 
relying upon Harper and Riggins as setting the framework for determining whether and 
under what circumstances the government may forcibly administer antipsychotic 
medication to render a criminal defendant competent to stand trial); see MORRIS, supra 
note 73, at 86–98 (discussing and critiquing the Sell decision).
 75. Perlin, supra note 71, at 242.  But see MORRIS, supra note 73, at 29–167, for a 
discussion of various ways in which a mental patient’s right to refuse treatment is 
undermined.  For example, some courts have substituted an informal review of the 
patient’s decision to refuse treatment—conducted by a staff psychiatrist or hospital 
committee—for a court review of the patient’s competency to refuse treatment.  See, e.g.,
Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 838, 850–51, 853 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded,
458 U.S. 1119 (1982), on remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983).  Professor Perlin has 
characterized the Rennie professional judgment model as a “limited due process model” 
as contrasted with the Rogers “expanded due process model.”  See, e.g., 2 PERLIN, supra 
note 2, § 3B–7.2, at 260–61; Perlin, supra note 71, at 242.  Nevertheless, I believe that 
substituting an informal review of a patient’s decision to refuse treatment by a staff 
psychiatrist or hospital committee for a formal hearing on the patient’s competency by a 
judge or other law-trained decisionmaker replaces due process with less than due 
process. See generally MORRIS, supra note 73, at 29–53. 
76. See 2 PERLIN, supra note 2, §§ 3B-1 to 3B-2, at 155 n.1, 157 n.2, 165–67 
nn.27–33 (citing sources); see also Grant H. Morris, Dr. Szasz or Dr. Seuss: Whose 
Right to Refuse Mental Health Treatment?, 9 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 283 (1981). 
 77. 1 PERLIN, supra note 2, §§ 2B-1 to 2B-15, at 191–292. 
 78. 2 PERLIN, supra note 2, § 3B-11, at 360–63.  Incredibly, Professor Perlin’s 
three-page discussion of the adequacy of counsel in right to refuse treatment proceedings 
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addresses the adequacy of counsel in this context,79 and the author of that 
article urges attorneys to adopt a paternalistic, best interests approach to 
representing patients who refuse treatment.80
In a recent article, Professor Perlin asserted that lawyers perform a 
“mediocre job”81 in representing persons in the civil commitment process 
and an “equally mediocre job”82 in representing mental patients in the 
right to refuse treatment process.  It is logical to assume that if lawyers 
do not actively represent mentally disordered clients in involuntary 
civil commitment hearings, they are even less likely to actively represent 
involuntarily committed mental patients in hearings to establish their 
competence to refuse treatment.  If lawyers defer to medical judgment in 
the decision of whether a mentally disordered person should be involuntarily 
confined, they are more likely to defer to medical judgment that an 
involuntarily committed patient who refuses treatment lacks competence 
to do so.  After all, the doctor is the most qualified individual to 
determine what medication is appropriate to treat the patient’s mental 
condition.  Surely, a decision by the patient to accept the prescribed 
medication that may result in an improved mental condition with the 
potential for release from confinement will be viewed by the doctor—as 
well as by the patient’s lawyer—as the rational decision.  If the patient 
rejects the doctor’s choice, a fortiori, the patient is perceived to be 
incompetent to make that unwise decision. 
is located within a 233-page unit devoted to the topic of the right to refuse treatment.  Id. 
at §§ 3B-1 to 3B-16, at 153–385. 
79. Id. § 3B-11, at 360 n.1623 (citing Melvin R. Shaw, Professional Responsibility 
of Attorneys Representing Institutionalized Mental Patients in Relation to Psychotropic 
Medication, 22 J. HEALTH & HOSP. L. 186 (1989)).  In the most recent cumulative 
supplement to Professor Perlin’s treatise, he cites one other article on the subject.  2 
PERLIN, supra note 2, § 3B-11, at 360 n.1623 (Supp. 2008) (citing Neal Milner, The
Right to Refuse Treatment: Four Case Studies of Legal Mobilization, 21 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 447 (1987)).  Surprisingly, Milner’s article was published in 1987, two years prior 
to the publication of Shaw’s article cited in the treatise itself. 
 80. Shaw, supra note 79, at 191.  Shaw asserts that attorneys need to consider the 
medical consequences to patients from their decisions to refuse treatment.  Id. at 191–92.  
Without needed medication, patients may “stagnate or deteriorate as inpatients, indefinitely or 
permanently.”  Id. at 190.  Shaw favors abridging a patient’s right to refuse treatment in 
order to quickly restore the patient’s health and freedom.  Id. at 192. 
 81. Michael L. Perlin, “And My Best Friend, My Doctor/Won’t Even Say What It 
Is I’ve Got”: The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment Cases,
42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735, 737 (2005). 
82. Id.
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IV. THE USE OF MENTAL HEALTH CONSERVATORSHIPS TO                 
ACHIEVE CIVIL COMMITMENT AND INVOLUNTARY                                                 
TREATMENT IN CALIFORNIA
In 1967, the California Legislature enacted the Lanterman-Petris-Short 
Act (LPS), which made fundamental changes in the standards and 
procedures for civil commitment.83  LPS was hailed as “the Magna Carta 
of the mentally ill.”84  LPS has been commended by writers85 and judges,86
serving as a model of progressive legislation that has been copied by 
other state legislatures.87  With only some minor tinkering over the 
years, LPS remains the law today in California.  Under LPS, if a person, 
as a result of mental disorder, is believed to be a danger to others, a 
danger to himself or herself, or gravely disabled, the person may be 
detained for an initial seventy-two-hour treatment and evaluation 
period.88  Thereafter, the person may be certified for a fourteen-day 
 83. Division 5 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code, entitled Community
Mental Health Services, was added by the California Mental Health Act of 1967, ch. 
1667, § 36, 1967 Cal. Stat. 4053, 4074.  Division 5 consists of two parts: the Lanterman-
Petris-Short Act, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5000–5550 (West 1998 & Supp. 2008), 
which provides the standards and procedures for civil commitment, and the Bronzan-
McCorquodale Act (formerly the Short-Doyle Act), id. §§ 5600–5772, which provides 
the legislative framework for the organizing and financing of “community mental health 
services for the mentally disordered in every county through locally administered and 
locally controlled community mental health programs.”  Id. § 5600 (West 1998). 
 84. The statement is attributed to Maurice Rodgers, spokesperson for the 
California State Psychological Association.  EUGENE BARDACH, THE SKILL FACTOR IN 
POLITICS: REPEALING THE MENTAL COMMITMENT LAWS IN CALIFORNIA 126 (1972).  
Other writers also state that LPS has been described as the Magna Carta of the mentally 
ill, but they do not reveal the source of the statement.  See, e.g., Constitutional Rights of 
the Mentally Ill: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d  Sess. 316 (1970) (statement of Dr. Roger 
Egeberg, Assistant Secretary for Health and Scientific Affairs, Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare); Marc F. Abramson, The Criminalization of Mentally Disordered 
Behavior: Possible Side-Effect of a New Mental Health Law, 23 HOSP. & COMMUNITY 
PSYCHIATRY 101, 105 (1972). 
85. See, e.g., FRANK W. MILLER ET AL., THE MENTAL HEALTH PROCESS xvi (2d ed. 
1976) (characterizing the California experiment as “innovative” and declaring that LPS 
“must be considered throughout any discussion of mental health programs”). 
86. See, e.g., David L. Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI.
L. REV. 742, 753 (1969) (“[LPS] promises virtually to eliminate involuntary hospitalization 
except for short-term crisis situations. . . .  The procedural protections it promises are 
impressive indeed when compared with commitment proceedings in other states.”). 
87. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.05.010–71.05.940 (West 2008). 
 88. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West 1998) (authorizing detention, without 
court order, for seventy-two hours to evaluate and treat mentally disordered persons who 
are a danger to self or others or gravely disabled); id. § 5200 (authorizing court-ordered 
detention for seventy-two hours to evaluate and treat persons who are a danger to self or 
others or gravely disabled). 
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intensive treatment period if he or she is determined to be dangerous or 
gravely disabled.89
LPS eliminates indeterminate commitment of nondangerous, mentally 
ill persons and uses conservatorships for gravely disabled patients who 
need assistance in managing their affairs after they have been treated in a 
mental hospital for seventeen days or less.90  For a conservator to be 
appointed, the court must find that the patient is gravely disabled.  
“Grave disability” is defined as “[a] condition in which [the] person, as a 
result of mental disorder, is unable to provide for his or her basic 
personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter.”91  The conservatorship is 
established for a one-year period, but it may be reestablished upon proof 
of continuing grave disability.92
At the time a conservatorship is established, the court may grant the 
conservator93 the authority to place the conservatee in a mental hospital 
89. Id. § 5250 (authorizing certification for fourteen days of intensive treatment for 
persons who are a danger to self or others or gravely disabled). 
 90. The California legislative subcommittee that recommended revision of 
California’s civil commitment statutes issued a report that served as a resource document 
for the LPS legislation.  That report recommended the creation of LPS conservatorships 
to provide continuing assistance in managing the affairs of those gravely disabled 
patients who needed such assistance following treatment during a fourteen-day certification.  
SUBCOMM. ON MENTAL HEALTH SERVS., ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMM. ON WAYS AND 
MEANS, CAL. LEGIS., THE DILEMMA OF MENTAL COMMITMENTS IN CALIFORNIA: A
BACKGROUND DOCUMENT 133 (1966). 
 91. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5008(h)(1)(A) (West 1998). 
92. Id. § 5361. 
 93. A statute provides that the selection of a conservator shall be subject to the 
following list of priorities: (1) the nominee of the proposed conservatee if the proposed 
conservatee has sufficient capacity to make an intelligent preference; (2) the spouse or 
domestic partner of the proposed conservatee; (3) an adult child of the proposed 
conservatee; (4) a parent of the proposed conservatee; (5) a brother or sister of the 
proposed conservatee; (6) any other person or entity eligible for appointment as a 
conservator.  However, the statute also provides that appointment of a conservator is 
subject to this list of priorities “unless the officer providing conservatorship investigation 
recommends otherwise to the superior court.”  Id. § 5350(b)(1) (West Supp. 2008) 
(incorporating by reference the list of priorities in CAL. PROB. CODE § 1812(b) (West 
2002)).  In practice, the conservatorship investigator almost invariably recommends the 
appointment of a public agency—such as the Office of the Public Conservator—as 
conservator, and the court almost invariably accepts the recommendation.  See Grant H. 
Morris, Conservatorship for the “Gravely Disabled”: California’s Nondeclaration of 
Nonindependence, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 201, 226–27 (1978) (finding that relatives or 
friends were selected as conservator in only three of the 461 cases in which LPS 
conservatorships were established in San Diego County over a nine-month period). 
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or other mental treatment facility94 and to require the conservatee to 
receive treatment to remedy or prevent the recurrence of the conservatee’s 
condition of grave disability.95  Although the court, in appointing a 
conservator for a gravely disabled person, has discretion to grant or to 
withhold such authority, the court almost always grants it to the conservator.96
California statutes provide that a mentally competent person may 
apply for voluntary admission to a mental treatment facility, or if the 
person is a conservatee, the conservatee’s conservator may apply if the 
court has granted the conservator the authority to place the conservatee 
in such a facility.97  However much the conservatee protests, the 
conservatee is admitted to that facility as a voluntary patient.  However 
much the conservatee protests, the conservatee may be required to take 
psychotropic medication that the doctor prescribes and that the conservator, 
exercising a substituted judgment for the conservatee, authorizes. 
Elsewhere, I characterize these conservatorship statutes as “California’s 
nondeclaration of nonindependence,”98 laws that allow civil commitment 
and coerced treatment without the crunch.99  For conservatees, there is 
no involuntary civil commitment hearing.  For conservatees, there is no 
right to refuse treatment hearing.  Under California’s “Magna Carta of the 
mentally ill,” conservators are given carte blanche control over conservatees. 
The use of conservatorships to assure involuntary detention and 
coercive treatment is the option of choice for civilly committed patients 
whom society deems worthy of long-term control.  In the most current 
report available, the California Department of Mental Health reveals that 
in the 2005–2006 fiscal year, 138,295 adults were detained on seventy-
two-hour evaluation holds as dangerous to self, dangerous to others, or 
gravely disabled.100  Of that number, 57,386 were subsequently detained 
on fourteen-day intensive treatment certifications, using the same commitment 
criteria.101  How many of those individuals were subsequently detained 
for a 180-day period as presenting “a demonstrated danger of inflicting 
 94. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5358(a)(1), (2) (West 1998).  The placement, 
however, must be “in the least restrictive alternative placement, as designated by the 
court.” Id. § 5358(a)(1)(A). 
95. Id. § 5358(b). 
96. See infra text accompanying notes 240–41. 
 97. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6000(a) (West 1998).  Although other voluntary 
patients may depart the facility by giving notice of a desire to do so, LPS conservatees 
may depart only if notice is given by their conservators.  Id. § 6002. 
 98. Morris, supra note 93, at 201. 
99. Id. at 215. 
 100. STATISTICS & DATA ANALYSIS, CAL. DEP’T OF MENTAL HEALTH, INVOLUNTARY 
DETENTION DATA—FISCAL YEAR 2005–2006 (July 1, 2005–June 30, 2006), at 3 tbl.1 
(2008), http://www.dmh.ca.gov/Statistics_and_Data_Analysis/docs/InvoluntaryDetention_ 
FY05-06/Rep0506_FINAL.pdf. 
101. Id. at 5 tbl.3. 
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substantial physical harm upon others”?102  Only twenty-one met that 
standard.103  Is it likely that after only seventeen days or less of inpatient 
hospitalization, there were only twenty-one dangerously mentally 
disordered people in the entire state of California?  Highly doubtful!  
But many of those who were initially detained as dangerous to others 
were suddenly found to be gravely disabled and were processed through 
the conservatorship route.104  For fiscal year 2005–2006, a total of 
10,004 conservatorships were established.105  Thus, conservatorships 
were used in 99.8% of cases (that is, 10,004 LPS conservatorships out of 
10,025 total cases) in which long-term control over a mentally disordered 
person (that is, 180 days or longer) was regarded as appropriate.  Over 
thirty years ago, Dr. Alan Stone characterized conservatorships as the “one 
escape hatch” used to prolong confinement of mentally disordered persons 
in California.106  His characterization is equally appropriate today. 
This grant of authority to conservators to involuntarily commit their 
conservatees as “voluntary” patients and to impose treatment upon them 
 102. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5300 (West 1998) (establishing the criteria for 
180-day involuntary commitment of demonstrably dangerous persons).  Although the 
danger criteria of section 5300 are rarely used to involuntarily commit patients in 
California, the criteria are frequently used to impose involuntary treatment on patients 
already committed as mentally disordered offenders.  In In re Qawi, 81 P.3d 224, 234 
(Cal. 2004), the California Supreme Court held that mentally disordered offenders are 
“the only class of LPS patients” that are not afforded the right to refuse treatment; but see
MORRIS, supra note 73, at 123–39 (critiquing the Qawi decision).
 103. STATISTICS & DATA ANALYSIS, supra note 100, at 8 tbl.6. 
 104. Even in habeas corpus hearings conducted shortly after a person was initially 
detained as both dangerous to others and gravely disabled, the grounds for confinement 
were “bargained down” to grave disability only.  Carol A.B. Warren, Involuntary 
Commitment for Mental Disorder: The Application of California’s Lanterman-
Petris-Short Act, 11 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 629, 645 (1977).  Grave disability has become 
the “catchall” category to continue commitment of a patient when it might be difficult to 
prove that the patient was a danger to others.  Id. at 646.  A dangerous or potentially 
dangerous patient who has been reclassified as gravely disabled is eligible for a 
conservatorship.  Id. at 648. 
 105. STATISTICS & DATA ANALYSIS, supra note 100, at 9 tbl.7.  In its statistical 
report, the Department of Mental Health listed these conservatorships as “permanent 
conservatorships.”  Id.  However, under the LPS statutes, conservatorships are established for 
a one-year period.  CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5361 (West 1998).  The conservatorship 
may be reestablished for successive one-year periods upon a finding that the conservatee 
continues to be gravely disabled.  Id.  In addition to the 10,004 one-year conservatorships, 
5297 temporary conservatorships were established during fiscal year 2005–2006.  
STATISTICS & DATA ANALYSIS, supra note 100, at 9 tbl.7.  Temporary conservatorships 
are established for thirty days pending a determination of whether a one-year 
conservatorship is appropriate.  CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5352.1 (West 1998). 
 106. ALAN A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 64 (1976). 
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over their objection cannot be justified.  In Riese v. St. Mary’s Hospital 
& Medical Center,107 the California Court of Appeal held that mental 
patients involuntarily committed pursuant to California’s seventy-two-
hour treatment and evaluation hold108 or subsequently certified for fourteen 
days pursuant to California’s intensive treatment hold109 could not be 
required to take psychotropic medication against their will in nonemergency 
situations.110 “It is one of the cardinal principles of LPS,” said the court, 
“that mental patients may not be presumed incompetent solely because 
of their hospitalization.”111  The individual’s right to give or withhold 
consent to medical treatment—including treatment with psychotropic 
medication—“does not disappear upon involuntary commitment.”112
Before treatment can be imposed on an involuntary patient without the 
patient’s consent, the Riese court required that “there must be an 
evidentiary hearing directed to the question whether the patient is able to 
understand and knowingly and intelligently act upon information 
required to be given regarding the treatment.”113  The court conducting that 
hearing must determine the patient’s incapacity by clear and convincing 
evidence.114  If the court determines that the involuntary patient possesses 
the capacity to give informed consent to psychotropic medication and the 
 107. 243 Cal. Rptr. 241 (Ct. App. 1987), review granted, 751 P.2d 893 (Cal. 1988), 
review dismissed and court of appeal opinion ordered published, 774 P.2d 698 (Cal. 
1989), republished opinion, 271 Cal. Rptr. 199 (Ct. App. 1987).  Hereinafter, the Riese
case will be cited to the court’s republished opinion.  For a more detailed discussion of 
the Riese case and its implementation, see Grant H. Morris, Judging Judgment: Assessing the 
Competence of Mental Patients to Refuse Treatment, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 343, 365–84 (1995). 
 108. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West 1998). 
109. Id. § 5250. 
110. Riese, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 201 (holding that involuntarily committed patients 
have the right to exercise informed consent).  The Riese court relied upon numerous 
statutory provisions to support the requirement of informed consent by involuntarily 
committed mental patients.  See id. at 204–10.  The court specifically rejected the 
argument that the failure of LPS to explicitly grant to involuntary patients the right to 
refuse psychotropic medication constitutes a basis for denying them that right.  Id. at 
208.  Although the court withheld judgment on whether constitutional bases also support 
informed consent in this context, id. at 201, it noted that the right of persons not 
adjudicated incompetent to give or withhold consent to medical treatment—including 
treatment with psychotropic medication—is protected both by the common law and by 
the constitutional right to privacy.  Id. at 207–08.  California courts uphold decisions by 
competent adults to refuse life-sustaining treatment.  Id. at 208 (discussing Bartling v. 
Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225 (Ct. App. 1984)).  Logically, they cannot reject 
non-life-threatening medication-refusal decisions by competent mental patients. 
111. Riese, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 206. 
112. Id. at 213. 
113. Id. at 211.  In so ruling, the court adopted LPS statutory provisions governing 
the determination of a patient’s capacity to consent to electroconvulsive therapy, 
declaring that those provisions were “equally appropriate” to the determination of a 
patient’s capacity to decide whether to consent to psychotropic medication.  Id.
114. Id.
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patient refuses to do so, “the patient may not be required to undergo the 
treatment.”115
In 1991, two years after the Riese decision was republished, the 
California Legislature enacted statutes that confirm and codify, with 
some modifications,116 Riese’s competency hearing requirement.117  The 
legislation specifically declares that involuntarily committed mental 
patients have a right to refuse treatment with psychotropic medication.118
Even if a patient is determined to lack the capacity to refuse treatment, 
the legislation provides that such incapacity remains in effect only for 
the duration of the seventy-two-hour or fourteen-day detention period. 
If a finding of grave disability is not sufficient, in and of itself, to 
warrant coerced treatment of an involuntarily detained mental patient, 
then is a finding of grave disability, made in a hearing to establish a 
conservatorship, sufficient to warrant coerced treatment of a conservatee?  
The answer, according to the California statutes, is yes.  Although the 
Riese court ruled that mental patients are not presumed incompetent 
solely because of their hospitalization,119 and although the establishment 
of a conservatorship is not an adjudication that the conservatee is 
incompetent120 or is incapable of making treatment decisions,121 nevertheless, 
115. Id. at 212. 
 116. For example, instead of judicial hearings to determine a patient’s capacity to 
give or withhold informed consent, the statute uses administrative hearings, conducted 
by a superior court judge, a court-appointed commissioner or referee, or a court-
appointed hearing officer.  CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5334(c) (West 1998).  At such 
hearings, patients are represented by counsel or by an advocate.  Id. § 5333(a). 
 117. Act of Oct. 7, 1991, ch. 681, 1991 Cal. Stat. 3076 (codified at CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE §§ 5008(l)–(m), 5325.2, 5332–5337 (West 1998 & Supp. 2008)). 
 118. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5325.2 (West 1998).  The right to refuse medication is 
not absolute; it is subject to statutory limitations.  Id.
 119. Riese, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 206. 
120. Id. at 204 (“Appointment of a conservator under LPS . . . does not involve an 
adjudication of incompetence . . . .”).  In Board of Regents v. Davis, 533 P.2d 1047 (Cal. 
1975), the California Supreme Court noted that LPS conservatorships, which are 
established for persons who are gravely disabled as a result of mental disorder or 
impairment by chronic alcoholism, are identical to Probate Code conservatorships 
established for other reasons.  Id. at 1053.  Probate Code conservatorships were created 
statutorily in 1957 as an alternative to guardianships in order to avoid the stigma of the 
label “incompetency.”  Id. at 1051.  Conservatorship law should not be interpreted to 
strip the competent conservatee of decisionmaking authority.  See id. at 1054. See
generally Morris, supra note 93, at 208–14 (discussing similarities and differences in 
Probate Code guardianships, Probate Code conservatorships, and LPS conservatorships 
in California). 
121. Riese, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 204 (“Appointment of a conservator under LPS . . . 
does not involve an adjudication of . . . incapacity to make treatment decisions about 
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in reality, conservatees are presumed incompetent solely because of their 
status as conservatees.  Although the Riese court ruled that an individual’s 
right to withhold consent to psychotropic medication “does not disappear 
upon involuntary commitment,”122 that right does disappear for conservatees 
when their conservators order them to undergo treatment as “voluntary” 
patients.
Surely, one would assume that the judge establishing the conservatorship 
is required to make some new finding of fact that the conservatee is 
incapable of making rational treatment decisions before the judge grants 
authority to the conservator to place the conservatee in a mental hospital 
or other mental treatment facility and to require the conservatee to 
accept treatment.  In dicta, the Riese court suggested that conservatees 
retain the right to refuse medical treatment “unless the court, after making 
appropriate findings, specifically denies the conservatee this right in its 
order and authorizes the conservator to make informed consent decisions.”123
one’s own body.”); see also Keyhea v. Rushen, 223 Cal. Rptr. 746, 751 (Ct. App. 1986) 
(“LPS conservatees have a right to refuse involuntary long-term psychotropic medication 
absent a judicial determination of their incompetency to do so.”); 60 Ops. Cal. Att’y 
Gen. 375, 377 (1977) (“[T]he conservatee is not divested of the right to make his or her 
own medical decisions absent a specific determination by the court that the conservatee 
cannot make those decisions.”). 
122. Riese, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 213. 
123. Id. at 204–05 (emphasis added); see also Keyhea, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 755 (noting 
that under LPS, a court determination of incompetency is required before long-term 
psychotropic medication may be administered without a patient’s consent); 60 Ops. Cal. 
Att’y Gen. 375, 377 (1977) (asserting that the court should not divest the conservatee of 
the right to make medical decisions “unless it finds that the conservatee lacks the mental 
capacity to rationally understand the nature of the medical problem, the proposed 
treatment and the attendant risks”). 
Because Riese was a class action lawsuit involving patients involuntarily detained on 
seventy-two-hour or fourteen-day holds, the court’s statement about rights of conservatees is 
dictum.  Years later, in In re Qawi, 81 P.3d 224, 233 (Cal. 2004), the California Supreme 
Court discussed, approvingly, the Riese decision. The Qawi court stated: “[T]he reasoning of 
Riese makes clear that the right does not apply solely to short-term LPS patients.”  Id.
The Qawi court asserted that individuals placed on one-year renewable conservatorships 
as gravely disabled possess the right to refuse psychotropic medication absent a judicial 
determination of their incompetence to make treatment decisions.  Id. at 233–34.  The 
Qawi court also cited approvingly Keyhea v. Rushen, 223 Cal. Rptr. 746 (Ct. App. 1986), 
for the proposition that “LPS conservatees have a right to refuse involuntary long-term 
psychotropic medication absent a judicial determination of their incompetency to do so.”  
Qawi, 81 P.3d at 234 (quoting Keyhea, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 751).  Qawi, however, was a case 
involving a mentally disordered offender, not an LPS conservatee.  Keyhea was a case 
involving a mentally ill prisoner, not an LPS conservatee.  Neither Qawi nor Keyhea 
directly considered whether individuals placed on an LPS conservatorship retain the right to 
refuse treatment unless they are adjudicated incompetent.  Neither Qawi nor Keyhea directly 
considered whether, in the absence of legislation specifically mandating a competency 
hearing, the court establishing the conservatorship is precluded from authorizing the 
conservator to make treatment decisions for the conservatee without first conducting 
such a hearing.  No other California Supreme Court or California Court of Appeal case 
has considered or decided these issues.  These issues remain for future determination. 
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LPS conservatorship legislation, however, imposes no obligation on 
the court that establishes a conservatorship to make “appropriate findings” 
before granting the conservator placement and treatment authority over 
the conservatee.  LPS conservatorship legislation imposes no obligation 
on the court to determine that the conservatee is incompetent—that the 
conservatee lacks the mental capacity to give or withhold informed 
consent—before it grants the conservator the authority to order treatment 
that is imposed over the conservatee’s objection.  In fact, LPS 
conservatorship legislation does not even require that the court make any 
additional determination beyond a finding of grave disability.  Rather, an 
LPS conservatorship statute merely provides that the conservatorship 
investigator’s report to the court “shall contain his or her recommendations 
concerning the powers to be granted to . . . the conservator.”124  The next 
statute provides that the conservatorship investigator’s report shall 
recommend for or against the imposition of various disabilities on the 
conservatee, specifically mentioning as one such disability the right to 
refuse or consent to treatment related to the conservatee’s condition of 
grave disability.125  The statute following that one merely provides that 
“[a] conservator shall . . . have the right, if specified in the court order, to 
require his or her conservatee to receive treatment related specifically to 
remedying or preventing the recurrence of the conservatee’s being 
gravely disabled . . . .”126  Apparently, the finding of grave disability is 
sufficient, in and of itself, to warrant the court authorizing the conservator to 
place the conservatee in a mental hospital or other mental treatment 
facility and to require the conservatee to accept treatment.127
 124. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5356 (West 1998). 
 125. Id. § 5357. 
126. Id. § 5358(b).  The statutory language empowering the conservator to require 
the conservatee to receive treatment to prevent the recurrence of the conservatee’s grave 
disability seems inappropriate.  A conservatorship is established for a person who is currently 
gravely disabled.  If the conservatee is no longer gravely disabled, the conservatorship should 
terminate.  Mere concern that the condition of grave disability might recur is insufficient to 
continue the conservatorship and to continue the conservator’s power to require the 
conservatee to receive treatment.  See id. § 5364 (authorizing the conservatee, at six-
month intervals, to petition for a rehearing on his or her status as a conservatee). 
 127. Morris, supra note 93, at 228; see infra text accompanying notes 239–41 
(discussing a recent study conducted in San Diego County that revealed that in every 
case in which the court established or reestablished a conservatorship, the court authorized the 
conservator to place the conservatee in a mental hospital or other mental treatment facility and 
to require the conservatee to receive treatment for his or her mental condition). 
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One need only examine the facts of the Riese case to realize that 
conservatees, despite their inability to provide for their basic necessities 
of food, clothing, and shelter, can be competent to make treatment decisions 
regarding their mental disorder.  Eleanor Riese, the named plaintiff in 
the class action suit, entered St. Mary’s Hospital as a voluntary patient.  
Prior to this admission, she had been treated for chronic schizophrenia 
with Mellaril,128 a psychotropic medication.  As a result of that earlier 
treatment, her bladder had been severely damaged.  Nevertheless, the 
treating doctor prescribed Mellaril, and she consented to its use.  When 
she suffered side effects and refused further treatment with Mellaril, she 
was forcibly injected and was committed as an involuntary patient.  A 
week later, a conservatorship was recommended, and subsequently a 
conservatorship was established.  The court authorized the conservator 
to place Ms. Riese in a mental hospital and to require her to accept 
treatment over her objection.  When she refused to ingest medication 
orally, she was forcibly medicated intramuscularly.129  According to the 
Riese court, Ms. Riese “continued to suffer from swollen feet, urinary 
problems, shaking, memory loss and seizures.”130
Ms. Riese died on April 6, 1991.  She was forty-seven years old.  
Although no autopsy was performed, her death was attributed to renal 
failure resulting from the cumulative effects of medication she had 
received over her lifetime.131  Was Ms. Riese’s refusal to take psychotropic 
medication a competent decision based on rational reasons?  Yes.  Was 
her decision accepted by the treating physicians, by her conservator, and 
by the court?  No.  One could easily conclude that conservatorships are 
not established to provide needed assistance to conservatees who are 
unable to provide for food, clothing, and shelter.  Rather, conservatorships 
are established in order to subject conservatees to long-term treatment 
with psychotropic medication despite their protests. 
 128. Mellaril® was the Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corporation brand of thioridazine 
HCI.  PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE 2168 (49th ed. 1995).  Today, physicians receive a 
“black box” warning that thioridazine has the “POTENTIAL FOR SIGNIFICANT, 
POSSIBLY LIFE-THREATENING, PROARRHYTHMIC EFFECTS” and “SHOULD 
BE RESERVED FOR USE IN THE TREATMENT OF SCHIZOPHRENIC PATIENTS 
WHO FAIL TO SHOW AN ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE TO ADEQUATE COURSES 
OF TREATMENT WITH OTHER ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS.”  PHYSICIANS’ DESK 
REFERENCE 2182 (62d ed. 2008). 
 129. Riese v. St. Mary’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 201–02 (Ct. App. 
1987).
130. Id. at 202. 
 131. Telephone Interview with Colette Hughes, Protection and Advocacy, Inc., co-
counsel for Eleanor Riese in Riese v. St. Mary’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr. (July 11, 1994). 
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V. MEASURING THE ADEQUACY OF COUNSEL IN CONSERVATORSHIP 
HEARINGS CONDUCTED IN 1975 AND THE CALIFORNIA                            
SUPREME COURT’S RESPONSE TO ATTORNEY INADEQUACY
Eight years after LPS was enacted into law,132 I asked students in my 
seminar in Law and Mental Disorder to observe the conservatorship 
proceedings in the San Diego County Superior Court and gather data on 
the performance of attorneys representing individuals for whom a 
conservatorship was proposed.133  The students observed sixty-three court 
hearings and reported the following data.134  Eight hearings were one minute 
or less in duration.  Nineteen hearings were between one and two minutes in 
duration.  Nine hearings were between two and three minutes in duration.  
Thus, more than half the hearings—a total of thirty-six of the sixty-three 
that were observed—were completed in three minutes or less.135  The average 
duration of these LPS conservatorship hearings—less than three minutes— 
was actually shorter than the 4.7 minute average duration of civil commitment 
hearings conducted prior to the adoption of the LPS legislation.136
In forty-two of the sixty-three cases, counsel representing a proposed 
conservatee asked no questions of the reporting psychiatrist.  In most of 
the remaining twenty-one cases, the lawyer asked only one question.  In 
only one case did the proposed conservatee’s counsel request either the 
assistance of a psychiatrist or the examination of the proposed conservatee 
by another psychiatrist.  There was not a single case in which counsel for 
the proposed conservatee offered testimony of an independent psychiatrist.  
In fifty-six of the sixty-three cases, no questions were asked of the 
proposed conservatee. 
In fifty-eight of the sixty-three cases, counsel for the proposed 
conservatee neither proposed alternatives to conservatorship nor even 
suggested that others explore these possibilities.  In only five cases did 
counsel for the proposed conservatee recommend any specific person be 
appointed as conservator if a conservatorship was established.  In only two 
cases did counsel for the proposed conservatee request that a conservatorship, 
if established, terminate sooner than the one-year statutory maximum. 
 132. Although LPS was enacted in 1967, the operative date of the legislation was July 1, 
1969.  California Mental Health Act of 1967, ch. 1667, § 36, 1967 Cal. Stat. 4053, 4074. 
133. See Morris, supra note 93, at 225. 
134. See id. at 232–33. 
135. Id. at 232 n.173.  Only nine hearings were more than eight minutes in duration.  Id.
 136. SUBCOMM. ON MENTAL HEALTH SERVS., ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMM. ON WAYS
AND MEANS, supra note 90, at 43. 
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Among the disabilities that the court, in establishing a conservatorship, 
may impose upon the conservatee are suspension of the privilege to 
possess a license to operate a motor vehicle and the right to enter into 
contracts.137  In only one of the sixty-three cases did a lawyer urge that 
the proposed conservatee be permitted to retain his or her driver’s 
license, and in no case did a lawyer resist the imposition of contractual 
disability on his or her client.  Most significantly, in only two of the 
sixty-three cases did the lawyer for the proposed conservatee oppose 
granting authority to the conservator to place the conservatee in a mental 
treatment facility where he or she would be subjected to involuntary 
treatment for his or her mental disorder. 
Clearly, the conservatorship hearings observed by my students were 
meaningless formalities, “show” trials, an “empty shell,” to borrow 
words from Michael Perlin and Deborah Dorfman, “offering only an 
illusion of due process.”138  Rolling over and playing dead is not 
competent representation.  Rolling over and playing dead is not zealous 
advocacy on behalf of one’s client. 
Perhaps, it could be argued, such attorney inaction at the conservatorship 
hearing was appropriate.  The attorney may have made a reasoned 
decision not to contest conservatorship because the evidence of grave 
disability was so overwhelming that resistance was both futile and 
unwarranted.  But that is not what occurred.  Attorney nonperformance 
at trial was a direct result of the failure of attorneys to investigate the 
facts and to fully prepare their clients’ cases.  At the time of this study, 
attorneys for proposed conservatees who were indigent—and most 
were indigent—were appointed approximately once every six months 
as their names rotated up on an appointments list.  They were paid 
seventy-five dollars per case for their work.139  For this small fee, most 
attorneys made one visit to the client in the facility where the client was 
 137. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5357 (West 1998).  Other disabilities that can be 
imposed by the court are disqualification from voting and possessing a firearm, and the 
right to refuse treatment, whether related or unrelated to the conservatee’s condition of 
grave disability.  Id.
 138. Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, Is It More Than “Dodging Lions 
and Wastin’ Time”? Adequacy of Counsel, Questions of Competence, and the Judicial 
Process in Individual Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L.
114, 130 (1996). 
139. See Morris, supra note 93, at 234 n.177.  In 1975, San Diego County paid 
$57,975 to lawyers representing proposed conservatees in 742 hearings.  These attorneys 
were paid at a base rate of $75 per case, an increase from the $50 per case paid to attorneys in 
1974.  Extra payment was allowed when continuances were granted or when attorneys were 
able to convince the judge that extra work or extra expenses warranted such payment.  
With this extra payment, San Diego County spent an average of $78.13 per conservatorship 
case in 1975 ($57,975 divided by 742 equals $78.13).  Typically, an attorney was assigned to 
two cases at the time the attorney’s name rotated up for appointment.  Id.
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detained, ensured that the papers in the case were in order, and made 
an appearance at the conservatorship hearing.  Some attorneys did even 
less.  Several were observed meeting their clients for the first time at the 
hearing itself.  Appointed counsel almost never attended the psychiatric 
evaluation of their client that was performed a few days prior to the 
hearing, although they were permitted to do so.  Most attorneys did not 
even examine the psychiatric report prior to the hearing, even though the 
report was almost always entered into evidence upon stipulation and was 
often the most significant evidence in the case supporting the appointment 
of a conservator.  Some attorneys expressed concern that if they “make 
waves” at the hearing, they could jeopardize their chances of being appointed 
to represent proposed conservatees in future cases. 
In Conservatorship of Roulet,140 decided one year after the study was 
published, the California Supreme Court held that even though the 
process to establish an LPS conservatorship is a civil process in which 
the state is acting benevolently to assist the disabled person, 
nevertheless, proof beyond a reasonable doubt and jury unanimity are 
constitutionally mandated standards necessary to ensure that mental 
health conservatorships are established only for individuals who have 
been accurately determined to be gravely disabled.141  The court articulated 
several reasons to justify its decision to impose criminal due process 
safeguards.  First, the court equated the establishment of a conservatorship 
with involuntary civil commitment.  “One of the principal powers which 
the court may grant a conservator is the right to place a conservatee in an 
institution.”142  A conservatee “can be involuntarily confined in a mental 
hospital for up to a year by his or her conservator, with the possibility of 
additional year-long extensions.”143  Thus, despite its civil label, establishment 
of a conservatorship “threatens a person’s liberty . . . on as massive a scale 
as that traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions.”144
In addition to the loss of freedom from physical restraint, the 
conservatee is subject to various statutory disabilities—both within the 
 140. 590 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1979). 
141. Id. at 11.  The court specifically “requir[ed] the state to match its good intentions 
with proof beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant is in need of the state’s care.”  Id. at 4. 
142. Id. at 3. 
143. Id.
144. Id.  The court cited People v. Burnick, 535 P.2d 352, 360–62 (Cal. 1975), for 
the proposition that civil commitment threatens a person’s liberty to the extent that 
occurs with a criminal conviction.  The court then asserted that the logic of Burnick is 
“equally applicable” to conservatorships. Roulet, 590 P.2d at 3. 
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LPS statutes and apart from LPS—that may subject the conservatee to an 
even greater control over his or her life and a more serious deprivation of 
personal liberty than occurs when a person is convicted of a crime.145
For example, the court mentioned the potential loss of a license to practice a 
profession, to hold certain public offices, to remain employed as a teacher, 
to have custody of children, to marry, to object to sterilization, to refuse 
medical treatment, to possess a driver’s license, to own or possess firearms, 
to remain registered to vote, and to enter into contracts.146  Although the 
establishment of a conservatorship does not equate to a finding that the 
conservatee is incompetent,147 nevertheless, conservators may be granted 
the powers that are granted to the guardian of an incompetent person.148
The court also discussed the stigma that attaches when a conservatorship 
is established for a gravely disabled individual.  “There is compelling 
evidence,” said the court, “that society still views the mentally ill with 
suspicion.”149  A finding that the person is gravely disabled also seriously 
threatens the conservatee’s reputation.150  A person labeled “gravely disabled” 
by the state will, upon release from hospitalization, undoubtedly have 
difficulty securing employment, obtaining admission to school, or even 
meeting old acquaintances with the person’s reputation fully intact.151
The court then focused on three trial issues that strongly support a 
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and jury unanimity as 
constitutionally mandated standards in court proceedings to establish a 
conservatorship.  “‘Mental illness,”’ said the court, “is generally acknowledged 
to be a vague and uncertain concept.  Categories of mental diseases are 
notoriously unclear, often overlap, and frequently change.  The experts 
themselves often disagree on what is an appropriate diagnosis.”152
Nevertheless, despite the fallibility of psychiatric testimony, judges and 
juries, serving as factfinders in civil commitment and conservatorship 
145. Roulet, 590 P.2d at 6. 
146. Id. (citing statutes). 
147. See Morris, supra note 93, at 220.  LPS conservatorships, established under the 
Welfare and Institutions Code, are merely one form of conservatorship.  Id.; see also id. 
at 208–15 (discussing the similarities and differences in guardianships and 
conservatorships established through the California Probate Code and conservatorships 
established through the California Welfare and Institutions Code).  In Board of Regents 
v. Davis, 533 P.2d 1047, 1054 (Cal. 1975), the California Supreme Court held that absent 
a specific adjudication of incompetency, the imposition of a Probate Code conservatorship on 
an individual does not deprive the conservatee of contractual capacity.  As the court 
stated, “[I]f a proposed conservatee is competent, no reason compels a total abolition of 
his right to contract.”  Id. at 1054. 
 148. Roulet, 590 P.2d at 5. 
149. Id. at 6. 
150. Id. at 7. 
151. Id.
152. Id. at 10 (footnote omitted). 
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proceedings, typically defer to psychiatric judgments that the person has 
a mental disorder and that the mental disorder meets the statutory 
standard for commitment or a conservatorship.153  Exacerbating the 
situation is “the paternalistic attitude of some appointed counsel”154 in 
representing persons proposed for conservatorship.  The court specifically 
cited, and quoted from, the study conducted by my students and 
published the year prior to the court’s decision.155
Obviously, the court was displeased with the failure of counsel for 
proposed conservatees to vigorously oppose the deprivation of their 
clients’ personal liberty and the loss of reputation that results from a 
finding of grave disability and the appointment of a conservator.  The 
court cited approvingly a recent decision of the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court mandating minimum standards for attorneys in civil commitment 
proceedings.156  “Those standards call for ‘adversary counsel’ who must 
represent a client ‘zealously within the bounds of the law.’”157  By its 
decision to impose the criminal due process protections of proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt and jury unanimity, the court was signaling to 
attorneys that conservatorship proceedings are adversarial in nature—as 
adversarial as are criminal prosecutions—and that the court would not 
tolerate a paternalistic approach to the handling of these cases.  The 
notion that conservatorship proceedings are nonadversarial—that “we all 
work together here”158 to do what is in the patient’s best medical 
interest—was simply unacceptable.  The patient’s attorney was expected 
to actively challenge a psychiatrist’s opinion that a conservatorship was 
warranted and not simply to passively acquiesce in that judgment. 
 153. Id. at 10 n.13, 11. 
154. Id. at 11. 
155. Id. at 11 n.17.  Elsewhere in its opinion, the court cited studies reporting that 
counsel appointed to represent proposed patients in civil commitment proceedings “tend 
to play a paternalistic rather than an advocacy role.”  Id. at 10 (citing Litwack, supra 
note 37, at 827–31, and Andalman & Chambers, supra note 32).  The court also cited an 
empirical study of habeas corpus hearings conducted in California.  Roulet, 590 P.2d at
10 (citing Warren, supra note 104, at 633).  That study reported that the attorneys for the 
patients “generally refrained from vigorous advocacy of their clients’ legal rights under 
LPS.”  Warren, supra note 104, at 633. 
156. Roulet, 590 P.2d at 11 n.16 (citing and quoting State ex rel. Memmel v. 
Mundy, 249 N.W.2d 573, 577 (Wis. 1977)). 
157. Id.
 158. In a study of habeas corpus proceedings under LPS, Carol Warren reported: “A 
phrase often used by all personnel in the court to refer to the nonadversary nature of the 
proceedings was: ‘we all work together here.’”  Warren, supra note 104, at 633.  The phrase 
seems equally applicable to the way conservatorship proceedings are processed under LPS. 
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Five years after the California Supreme Court’s decision in Roulet, the 
United States Supreme Court acknowledged the “vital importance”159 of
criminal defense counsel.  According to the Court, ineffective assistance of 
counsel “undermine[s] the proper functioning of the adversarial process [such] 
that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”160  Thus, 
defense counsel’s “overriding mission [is] vigorous advocacy of the defendant’s 
cause.”161  Because the loss of liberty and the imposition of disabilities are 
as great or greater for conservatees than for prisoners, vigorous advocacy is 
also the overriding mission of attorneys representing individuals subjected to 
conservatorship proceedings in California.  Recently, the California Court of 
Appeal ruled that “a proposed conservatee has a statutory right to effective 
assistance of counsel”162 and that such a right is protected by due process.163
The court added: “We see no meaningful distinction between criminal 
and LPS proceedings insofar as the procedures required to guard against the 
erroneous deprivation of the right to effective assistance of counsel.”164
VI. MEASURING THE ADEQUACY OF COUNSEL IN CONSERVATORSHIP 
HEARINGS CONDUCTED IN 2007–2008
Conservatorship proceedings are conducted in San Diego County 
Superior Court on Tuesday and Thursday mornings.  Thus, in the period 
commencing December 20, 2007, and ending March 27, 2008, proceedings 
were conducted on twenty-eight days.  On twenty-two days during that 
period, law students who recently completed my course in Law and 
Mental Disorder attended those sessions and recorded information about 
those proceedings.165  Unlike the study conducted in 1975, the calendar 
for conservatorship proceedings was divided into two parts.  Cases that 
were uncontested or in which the parties stipulated as to the results were 
 159. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984). 
160. Id. at 686. 
161. Id. at 689. 
162. In re Conservatorship of David L., 79 Cal. Rptr. 3d 530, 536 (Ct. App. 2008).  
The court ruled that “[t]he duty of counsel to perform in an effective and professional 
manner is implicit” in the statute providing for the appointment of the public defender or 
other attorney for the proposed conservatee.  Id. (interpreting CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE 
§ 5365 (West 1998)). 
163. David L., 79 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 536. 
164. Id. at 537. 
 165. I wish to thank the following students who volunteered to participate in this 
study and to acknowledge their contribution to this study.  The four students are: Michele 
Brown, Joy Simon, Kevin Yee, and Douglas Wacker.  I extend a special note of thanks 
to Joy Simon who coordinated the court visits by the students and who attended significantly 
more times than did other students.  Students attended court on two of the three days that 
court sessions were held in the month of December beginning on December 20, 2007; 
nine of the nine sessions held in January 2008; five of the eight sessions held in February 
2008; and six of the eight sessions held in March 2008. 
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conducted first; contested cases were conducted subsequently.  Each will 
be discussed separately below.  Table One indicates the number and type of 
cases handled in the twenty-two sessions in which data were gathered 




Disposition of Cases in  
Each Category
Stipulated Cases 186 Conservatorship 
reestablished in 186 cases 
Uncontested Cases 52 Conservatorship  
established in 52 cases 
Continuances 251 Hearing postponed in    
251 cases 
Terminations 13 Conservatorship 
terminated  in 13 cases 
Contested Cases to Establish   
New Conservatorship 
34 Conservatorship  
established in 34 cases 
Contested Cases to Reestablish 
Conservatorship 
13 Conservatorship  
established in 12 cases 
Rehearing on Issue of Grave 
Disability 
1 Conservatorship upheld  
in 1 case 
Contested Case to Establish 
Conservatorship for Incompetent 
Criminal Defendant 
1 Conservatorship  
established in 1 case 
Totals for All  
Decided Cases166
298 Conservatorships 
established or  
reestablished in 284  
cases (95.3% of the total)
166. The total of 298 “decided” cases is composed of 52 cases in which new 
conservatorships were established as uncontested matters, 186 cases in which conservatorships 
were reestablished through stipulation, 13 cases in which conservatorships were terminated 
without a hearing, 34 contested cases to establish new conservatorships, and 13 contested cases 
to reestablish conservatorships.  The total excludes the 251 cases in which continuances were 
requested and were granted.  Two other contested cases were not included in the total.  In 
one of those cases, an existing conservatorship was upheld after a rehearing to determine 
whether the conservatee was gravely disabled.  See infra text accompanying notes 213–14.  In 
the other case, a conservatorship was established for a criminal defendant who had been 
found mentally incompetent to stand trial.  See infra text accompanying note 215. 
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A.   Uncontested or Stipulated Cases 
A total of fifty-two new conservatorships were established as 
uncontested cases in the twenty-two court sessions, an average of 2.4 
new conservatorships per session.  The highest number of uncontested 
new conservatorships established in any one session was six; the lowest 
number in any one session was zero.  A total of 186 conservatorships 
were reestablished167 for an additional year through stipulation of the 
parties, an average of 8.5 reestablished conservatorships per session.  
The highest number of stipulated conservatorships reestablished for an 
additional year in any one session was thirteen; the lowest number was 
five.  A total of eleven conservatorships were terminated by stipulation 
of the parties, an average of 0.5 conservatorships per session.  The 
highest number of terminated conservatorships in any one session was 
two; the lowest number was zero.  Continuances were granted in a total 
of 251 cases, an average of 11.4 per session.  The highest number of 
continuances in any one session was twenty; the lowest was one.  The 
total number of all cases handled in this portion of the court hearings 
was 502 (including the granting of continuances), an average of 22.8 
cases per session.  If continuances are excluded, the total number of 
cases in which a decision was made to establish a new conservatorship, 
reestablish an existing conservatorship, or terminate a conservatorship 
was 251, an average of 11.4 per session. 
Although the patients’ attorneys in the 1975 study of conservatorship 
hearings did not actively contest the finding of grave disability and the 
appointment or reappointment of a conservator, the hearings that the 
students observed that year were not characterized as uncontested or 
stipulated cases.  The development of this portion of the court’s 
calendar—a significant portion, indeed—appears to have occurred since 
that earlier study.  How much time did the court devote to deciding these 
cases?  In the twenty-two court sessions, a total of 292 minutes—less 
than five hours in all—was spent on the uncontested or stipulated cases, 
an average of 13.3 minutes per session.  The longest time spent in any 
one session was twenty-nine minutes; the shortest was three minutes.  
Think of it.  A total of 502 cases were considered in 292 minutes.  That 
is an average time of 34.9 seconds spent on each case.  Even if the 
granting of continuances took no time at all, a total of 251 cases to 
establish, reestablish, or terminate conservatorships were resolved in 292 
 167. An LPS conservatorship automatically terminates one year after the court 
appoints a conservator.  The conservator may petition the court to reestablish the 
conservatorship and to be reappointed as conservator for a succeeding one-year period.  
The same procedure is used to reestablish the conservatorship in subsequent years.  CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 5362 (West 1998). 
MORRIS 7/6/2009 9:01:27 AM 
[VOL. 46:  283, 2009] “Let’s Do the Time Warp Again” 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
 319
minutes.  That is an average time of one minute and 9.8 seconds spent on 
each case. 
The large number of continuances (251) is particularly disturbing.  In 
most cases, the request for a continuance was made by the Public 
Defender who represented the proposed conservatee.168  The typical 
reason given by the proposed conservatee’s attorney for requesting the 
continuance was the need for further investigation.  But why is more 
time needed for such investigation?  The conservatorship process is 
initiated by the recommendation of a mental health professional at the 
facility in which a patient is receiving treatment.169  Upon receiving the 
recommendation, a conservatorship investigation officer—in San Diego 
County, the Office of the Public Conservator is the investigative agency— 
conducts an evaluation of the patient, and if the officer concurs in the 
recommendation, petitions the court to establish a conservatorship.170  The 
court is required by statute to appoint the Public Defender or another 
attorney to represent the proposed conservatee within five days after the 
date of the petition and to conduct a hearing within thirty days of the 
date of the petition.171  If the proposed conservatee’s attorney is appointed 
within five days after the petition, and the court hearing is conducted 
three or more weeks later, the lawyer should have ample time to prepare 
for the hearing.  This seems especially true today when, as will be 
discussed below, the proposed conservatee’s attorney conducts only a 
 168. E-mail from Leonard W. Pollard II, Senior Deputy County Counsel, County of 
San Diego, to Grant H. Morris, Professor of Law (Sept. 8, 2008, 16:05:59 PDT) (on file 
with author).  In San Diego, Mr. Pollard, on behalf of the Office of County Counsel, 
often represents the petitioner for the establishment of a conservatorship.  Mr. Pollard 
also reported: “However, sometimes, the Public Conservator court investigator requests a 
continuance because the plan is not to ultimately establish the conservatorship because 
the temporary conservatee is improving, but is not yet stable enough for discharge.”  Id.
Such a practice is highly questionable.  The Public Conservator, acting as conservatorship 
investigator, is only permitted to petition the court to establish a conservatorship if the 
Public Conservator determines that the proposed conservatee is gravely disabled. CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 5352 (West 1998).  Before petitioning for a conservatorship to be 
established, the Public Conservator is required to “investigate all available alternatives to 
conservatorship and [to] recommend conservatorship to the court only if no suitable 
alternatives are available.”  Id. § 5354. The Public Conservator should not be petitioning 
for the establishment of a conservatorship, and extending the proposed conservatee’s 
involuntary detention through a temporary conservatorship, in situations in which the 
Public Conservator does not believe that a conservatorship is warranted and does not 
intend to pursue its establishment. 
 169. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5352 (West 1998). 
170. Id.
171. Id. § 5365. 
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limited cross-examination of the psychiatrist who testifies at the hearing 
in support of the conservatorship petition, does not seek the assistance of 
a psychiatrist to evaluate the proposed conservatee or to testify on the 
proposed conservatee’s behalf at the hearing, and does not offer the 
testimony of a family member or any witness other than the proposed 
conservatee at the hearing.172
Perhaps, it could be argued, that the request for a continuance can be 
explained as an attempt to avoid the imposition of a conservatorship for 
as long as possible.  However, when the conservatorship investigation 
officer petitions for conservatorship, the court, relying on the officer’s 
report or the affidavit of the professional who recommended the 
conservatorship, may issue an ex parte order establishing a temporary 
conservatorship.173  The temporary conservator is statutorily authorized 
to continue the patient’s detention in a mental treatment facility pending 
the court hearing to determine whether a conservatorship should be 
established.174  Although a temporary conservatorship terminates thirty 
days after it is established, if the proposed conservatee demands a trial 
on the issue of whether he or she is gravely disabled, the court may 
extend the temporary conservatorship until that issue is decided.175  If a 
conservatorship is established, the one-year duration of that conservatorship 
does not include any time that the conservatee spent in a temporary 
conservatorship.176
Similarly, if a one-year conservatorship has been established, the court 
must notify the conservatee and the conservatee’s attorney at least sixty 
days before the termination of the one-year period.177  A petition to 
reestablish the conservatorship for an additional year must be filed at 
least thirty days before the automatic termination date.178  The facility in 
which the conservatee is detained is authorized to continue detaining the 
conservatee after the termination date of the conservatorship if proceedings 
to reestablish the conservatorship have not been completed and the court 
orders the conservatee to be held there until the proceedings have been 
completed.179  The statute that requires a hearing on a petition to establish a 
conservatorship to be held within thirty days of the petition, and for the 
172. See infra text accompanying notes 218–41 (discussing the performance of 
counsel for proposed conservatees in contested hearings observed in this study). 
 173. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5352.1 (West 1998). 
174. Id. § 5353. 
175. Id. § 5352.1.  The court, however, may not extend the temporary conservatorship 
for a period exceeding six months.  Id.
176. Id. § 5361. 
177. Id. § 5362. 
178. Id. § 5361.  The statute provides that the conservator petitions the court to be 
reappointed as conservator for a succeeding year.  Id.
179. Id. § 5361. 
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Public Defender or other attorney to be appointed within five days after 
the date of the petition, applies as well to hearings on petitions to 
reestablish conservatorships.180  Thus, an attorney representing a conservatee 
is notified that the conservatorship is due to expire at least sixty days 
before it expires.  If a petition to reestablish the conservatorship is filed, 
the attorney is notified three weeks or more before a hearing is 
conducted on that petition.181  Requests for continuances premised on the 
need to conduct further investigation should not be granted routinely by 
the court.  However, at least in San Diego County, they are. 
Perhaps, it could be argued, that the request for a continuance can be 
explained as a tactical decision by the proposed conservatee’s attorney to 
delay the hearing until the client’s mental condition has improved such 
that the client is a better—more rational—witness at the court hearing, or 
the petition to establish or reestablish a conservatorship is terminated 
without a hearing.  Such a tactic seems unwarranted for two reasons.  
First, the tactic requires the attorney to make a decision to subject the 
client to continued involuntary confinement and continued involuntary 
treatment until the hearing is held.  The client’s important liberty interests 
are sacrificed by the absence of a timely hearing to determine whether 
such loss of liberty is warranted.  An attorney’s ethical obligation to 
advocate zealously for his or her client in a hearing to prevent such loss 
is surely undermined by the attorney’s decision to request a continuance— 
which allows such loss to occur without the hearing.  Second, the tactic, 
if used, is rarely successful.  In the twenty-two days of hearings that my 
students observed, 298 cases were resolved.  Conservatorships were not 
established or were terminated in only thirteen cases.  Thus, conservatorships 
were either established or reestablished in 95.6% of the cases studied, 
whether or not a continuance was obtained to delay the hearing date. 
The large number of uncontested cases involving the establishment of 
conservatorships (fifty-two) and the even larger number of stipulated 
cases involving the reestablishment of conservatorships (186) are 
extremely problematic.  The statute provides that the mental health 
professional who recommends that a conservatorship be established 
must first determine not only that the person is gravely disabled but that 
he or she “is unwilling to accept, or incapable of accepting, treatment 
180. Id. § 5365. 
181. See SAN DIEGO SUP. CT. R. 8.2.32(B) (adopted July 1, 2006) (providing for a 
hearing on a petition to reestablish a conservatorship to be calendared “to be heard no 
less than 21 days nor more than 30 days from the date of filing of the written request”). 
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voluntarily.”182 The conservatorship investigating officer may only petition 
for a conservatorship to be established if the officer concurs with the 
recommendation.  If a person is unwilling to accept treatment voluntarily, 
then how can that individual be willing to accept the establishment or 
reestablishment of a conservatorship in which the court, in virtually every 
case, abrogates his or her right to refuse treatment183 and authorizes the 
conservator to impose treatment over the conservatee’s objection?184  And 
if the person is incapable of accepting treatment voluntarily, then how 
can that person be capable of voluntarily waiving the hearing at which 
his or her incapacity to accept treatment voluntarily will be determined?  
Stated theoretically, the capacity to evaluate the risks, benefits, and 
alternatives to proposed therapy may differ from the capacity to waive a 
hearing at which the person’s capacity to evaluate the risks, benefits, and 
alternatives to proposed therapy is determined.  But realistically, persons 
whose mental disorders so affect their rational thought processes such 
that they are incapable of deciding whether to accept treatment 
voluntarily are also likely to be so severely mentally disordered as to be 
incapable of competently waiving a hearing.  At a minimum, the court should 
conduct a careful examination of the proposed conservatee’s willingness and 
capacity to waive a hearing to establish or reestablish a conservatorship. 
In the hearings observed in this study, the judge did not perform the 
analysis that is required.  Rather, the judge simply accepted the two or 
three sentence explanation offered by the proposed conservatee’s 
attorney for why the case was not contested.  Typically, the attorney 
would merely state that he or she met with the proposed conservatee, 
that the proposed conservatee understands the nature of the conservatorship 
and the treatment, does not want to come to court, and does not object to 
the Public Defender appearing on the proposed conservatee’s behalf.  
Sometimes the attorney would offer a seemingly opposite reason for not 
contesting the proposed conservatorship.  For example, in one case, the 
attorney testified that the client lacked insight and could not understand 
the situation.  In others, the attorney testified that the client was decompensating 
and was uncontrollable or that the client was agitated and not directable.  
Sometimes, the attorney reported the client’s ambivalence toward the 
proceeding: “She didn’t want to be on a conservatorship but knew she 
 182. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5352 (West 1998). 
183. See id. § 5357 (providing that the conservatorship investigating officer’s report 
shall recommend for or against the imposition of various disabilities on the proposed 
conservatee, including “[t]he right to refuse or consent to treatment related specifically to 
the conservatee’s being gravely disabled”). 
184. Id. § 5358(b) (“A conservator shall also have the right, if specified in the court 
order, to require his or her conservatee to receive treatment related specifically to 
remedying . . . the conservatee’s being gravely disabled . . . .”). 
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needed help.”  In all cases, the court accepted the attorney’s explanation 
and decided the matter without further inquiry. 
Perhaps the failure of the court to distinguish between these different 
situations can be explained by a San Diego Superior Court rule that 
allows the court to proceed in the absence of the client if the attorney 
who requests the court to waive the client’s presence represents that the 
attorney has been in contact with the client and “that, in the attorney’s 
opinion, it is not in the best interests of the conservatee-client to be 
present in court or for the court to convene where the conservatee is then 
housed.”185  The rule places the attorney in the untenable position of 
reporting to the court the attorney’s assessment of the client’s best 
interests in a situation in which the client’s best interests, as assessed by 
the client’s attorney, conflict with the client’s legal right to oppose the 
establishment or reestablishment of a conservatorship and also conflict 
with the attorney’s obligation to assist the client in asserting that right.  
In discussing the proposed conservatee’s right to a court hearing on the 
issues of placement, disabilities to be imposed on the conservatee, and 
the powers of the conservator, the California Court of Appeal noted that 
the proposed conservatee’s attorney is charged with “protect[ing] the 
client’s rights and achiev[ing] the client’s fundamental goals.”186  The 
court added, “[T]he attorney may not, without the consent of his or her 
client, enter into an agreement that ‘impair[s] the client’s substantial 
rights or the cause of action itself.’”187  The San Diego County Superior Court 
rule, which deviates from the court of appeal’s decision, should be repealed. 
Several California Court of Appeal cases, originating in San Diego 
County, have considered the circumstances under which counsel for a 
proposed conservatee may communicate his or her client’s waiver of the 
right to be present at the hearing to establish a conservatorship.  For 
example, in Conservatorship of Moore, the court held that because 
conservatees are not automatically considered incompetent, their ability 
to knowingly and intelligently waive their right to a hearing on a petition 
 185. SAN DIEGO SUP. CT. R. 8.2.13 (adopted July 1, 2006). 
186. In re Conservatorship of Christopher A., 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 427, 433 (Ct. App. 
2006) (quoting Linsk v. Linsk, 449 P.2d 760, 764 (Cal. 1969)).  Although Linsk was a 
divorce case, the case was quoted by the California Court of Appeal in Christopher A. as 
authority for expressing the proper role of attorneys litigating conservatorship cases. 
187. Id. (quoting, in part, Linsk v. Linsk, 449 P.2d 760, 762 (Cal. 1969)).  In 2007, 
the California Court of Appeal reiterated its Christopher A. decision by including the 
quotations from Christopher A. in In re Conservatorship of Tian L., 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 382, 
388 (Ct. App. 2007). 
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for reestablishment of the conservatorship is a question of fact.188  The 
proposed conservatee’s attorney is required to contact the client, ascertain 
whether the client wants a hearing to oppose the reestablishment, and 
directly communicate the client’s decision to the court through a sworn 
affidavit.189  The court assumed that the client’s voluntary and intelligent 
waiver of rights can be inferred when the attorney is present in court.190
Upon the waiver of a hearing, the trial court may act on its own motion 
and grant the reestablishment petition ex parte.191
In Moore, the court of appeal asserted that even if the trial court erred 
in reestablishing the conservatorship, the conservatee’s loss of liberty 
would be de minimus because the conservatee can challenge the 
reestablishment through a statutory provision that allows the conservatee 
to petition the court for a rehearing as to his or her status as a 
conservatee or through a writ of habeas corpus.192  However, the court 
failed to consider that the conservatee bears the burden of proof in a 
rehearing on the conservatee’s status and in a habeas corpus hearing.193
For a conservatee who bears the burden of establishing that he or she is 
not gravely disabled, the potential for a loss of liberty is surely greater 
than that for a conservatee who the petitioner must prove, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, to be gravely disabled.  The two proceedings cannot 
be equated. 
In 2006, the California Court of Appeal held that in considering a 
petition to establish a conservatorship, the trial court, before accepting a 
stipulated judgment on placement of the conservatee, on disabilities to 
be imposed on the conservatee, and on powers of the conservator, “must 
consult with the conservatee to instruct him or her on the consequences 
of the stipulation and obtain the conservatee’s express consent to the 
 188. 229 Cal. Rptr. 875, 884 (Ct. App. 1986). 
189. Id. at 882. 
190. Id. at 884 (quoting Conservatorship of Chambers, 139 Cal. Rptr. 357, 364 (Ct. 
App. 1977)). 
191. Id. at 883 (holding that when the conservatee chooses not to contest the 
proceeding, the ex parte reestablishment of the conservatorship “offends neither the state 
nor federal constitutional requirements for due process”). 
192. Id. at 882.  The court cited CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5364 (West 1998), 
which authorizes a conservatee to petition for a rehearing as to his or her status as a 
conservatee.  The court also cited CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5362 (West 1998), which 
merely authorizes a conservatee to request a court hearing to contest a petition to 
reestablish a conservatorship.  The court failed to explain why this statute remains 
available to a conservatee after the trial court has already waived the hearing at the 
request of the conservatee’s attorney and has ordered the conservatorship reestablished 
through its ex parte decision. 
 193. In a rehearing on the conservatee’s status, conducted pursuant to CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 5364 (West 1998), SAN DIEGO SUP. CT. R. 8.2.22(A) (adopted July 1, 2006) 
specifically places the burden of proof upon the conservatee to establish, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the conservatee is no longer gravely disabled. 
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stipulation on those issues.”194  Less than one year later, that same court 
held that in considering a petition to reestablish a conservatorship, the 
trial court may reestablish the conservatorship without a court hearing, 
relying upon the sworn statement of the attorney that the client 
knowingly and willingly consented to the reestablishment of the 
conservatorship by stipulation and without a formal court hearing.195
The form signed by the attorney did not contain any indication that the 
issues of placement of the conservatee or disabilities to be imposed on 
the conservatee had been discussed with the client, and the attorney did 
not represent that she spoke to her client about those issues and that the 
conservatee had agreed to the proposed placement and the imposition of 
disabilities.196 Unlike the case involving the establishment of a 
conservatorship, here the court of appeal did not require the trial court to 
consult with the conservatee to instruct her on the consequences of 
stipulating to the reestablishment and to obtain the conservatee’s express 
consent to the stipulation on those consequences.  The court simply 
assumed that when the attorney indicated on the form that she “discussed 
reestablishment” with the client, the attorney presumably discussed the 
issues of placement and disabilities because, in the court’s words, those 
issues are “central to reestablishment.”197  Thus, for reestablishment of a 
conservatorship, there is no requirement that the trial court consult with 
the conservatee to instruct the conservatee on the consequences of 
stipulating and obtain the conservatee’s express consent to the stipulation, 
and there is no requirement that the trial court inquire of the attorney as 
to what was discussed with the client when the attorney swears that the 
attorney “discussed reestablishment” of the conservatorship with the client. 
The distinction is untenable.  A statute provides that a conservatorship 
“shall automatically terminate one year after the appointment of the 
conservator by the superior court.”198  Thus, a petition to reestablish a 
conservatorship is not a petition to continue an existing conservatorship.  
Rather, it is a petition to establish a new conservatorship when the existing 
conservatorship terminates.  The court’s obligations to consult with the 
194. In re Conservatorship of Christopher A., 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 427, 433 (Ct. App. 
2006).
195. In re Conservatorship of Tian L., 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 382, 384 (Ct. App. 2007). 
196. Id. at 387.  The court simply acknowledged that “the form could be improved 
by including a space to . . . show those issues were discussed and the conservatee agreed 
to their imposition without a hearing.”  Id.
197. Id. at 387–88. 
 198. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5361 (West 1998). 
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proposed conservatee to fully inform him or her of the consequences of a 
conservatorship, including placement and disabilities, and to obtain 
the proposed conservatee’s competent waiver of a hearing, should be 
identical for both proceedings.  After all, a proposed conservatee faces 
the same potential loss of liberty and stigmatization whether the 
proceeding is to establish a new conservatorship or to reestablish a 
conservatorship that is about to expire.199
Recently, the California Supreme Court agreed to review the decision 
in In re Conservatorship of John L.,200 a case from San Diego County 
decided by the California Court of Appeal.201  In John L., the appellate 
court ruled that in a reestablishment proceeding, the trial court may rely 
upon the unsworn representation of the proposed conservatee’s counsel 
that the client’s waiver of a hearing was knowing and intelligent.202  If 
the John L. decision is affirmed, the trial court will not be obligated to 
conduct its own evaluation to ensure that the proposed conservatee 
understands the consequences of a conservatorship and that the 
conservatee made a knowing and intelligent waiver of a court hearing.  
If this decision is affirmed, the trial court will not even be required to 
obtain a sworn statement from the proposed conservatee’s attorney that 
the attorney fully informed the proposed conservatee of the consequences of 
a conservatorship, including placement and disabilities, and that the 
proposed conservatee made a knowing and competent waiver of a hearing. 
In reaching its judgment, the court of appeal asserted that the cost of 
implementing a proposed safeguard of unwaivable mandatory presence 
of the proposed conservatee in court outweighed the additional protection 
accorded to the proposed conservatee “particularly given the presence of 
counsel, who we presume to be competent.”203  But can the attorney’s 
 199. It should be noted, however, that the very next statute distinguishes the 
establishment of new conservatorships from the reestablishment of conservatorships by 
requiring a court hearing or a jury trial on the reestablishment only if requested by the 
conservatee or the conservatee’s attorney.  CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5362 (West 
1998).  For new conservatorships, a court hearing occurs without such request, unless the 
hearing is waived by the conservatee.  See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5358(a)(1) (West 
1998).  If a petition to reestablish a conservatorship is not a petition to continue an 
existing conservatorship, but rather, is a petition to establish a new conservatorship when 
the existing conservatorship terminates, then section 5362 should be amended to equate 
the proceedings by eliminating the requirement of a request for a court hearing or jury 
trial in conservatorship reestablishment proceedings. 
 200. 172 P.3d 400 (Cal. 2007). 
201. In re Conservatorship of John L., 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 393 (Ct. App. 2007), review 
granted and opinion superseded by 172 P.3d 400 (Cal. 2007).  The California Court of 
Appeal decision may not be cited. 
202. Id. at 408.  The court stated, “[H]ere, counsel represented to the court that John 
had consented to his conservatorship and elected to waive his presence at the hearing.”  
Id. at 409. 
203. Id. at 407. 
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competence be presumed?  The large number of conservatorships 
reestablished through stipulation of counsel—186 cases in this study of 
twenty-two court sessions—and the insignificant amount of time spent 
to decide those cases—one minute and 9.8 seconds per case—strongly 
suggests that trial courts are not devoting the attention to conservatorship 
reestablishment cases that those cases properly deserve.204  In the John
L. case, for example, the conservatorship investigator’s report indicated 
that the investigator had met with John, and that “he ‘made it clear that 
he did not want a Conservator and thought that he did not need any 
assistance.’”205  At the hearing conducted one month and one day after the 
investigator met with John, John’s attorney stated, “When we met[, 
John] indicated that at this time he was not contesting the conservatorship.  
He did not want to be present in court.  So we would ask the court to 
excuse his presence.”206  The trial judge immediately responded, “His 
presence is excused.”207  John’s lawyer offered no explanation of why 
John’s attitude toward the conservatorship had changed, and the judge 
asked for none.  John’s lawyer then stipulated to the admission of the 
medical report and the conservatorship investigator’s report, and the trial 
court ordered the conservatorship reestablished.208
In her petition to the California Supreme Court for review of the court 
of appeal decision, John’s appellate attorney noted that judges are 
tempted to proceed as did the trial court in John’s case “because it was 
expeditious—the entire case was concluded in less than a minute or 
two.”209  However, the attorney aptly observed, “But the conveyor-belt 
aura of the proceedings does not inspire confidence that John’s rights were 
adequately protected, given the conflicting evidence regarding his wishes.”210
Hopefully, the California Supreme Court will use the John L. case to 
slow the conveyor belt, if not disengage it completely.  Although the 
 204. By way of comparison, only fifty-two new conservatorships were established 
in uncontested cases.  Consider also that in the twenty-two court sessions, only thirteen 
cases for reestablishment of conservatorships were contested cases, compared with thirty-
four contested cases involving new conservatorships.  Thus, in this study, stipulation of 
reestablishment of conservatorship occurred in 93.4% of the cases, compared with 60.5% 
of new conservatorships.  See supra Table One. 
205. John L., 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 397. 
206. Id. at 397–98. 
207. Id. at 398. 
208. Id.
 209. Petition for Review at *18, Conservatorship of John L., No. D048654, 2007 
WL 3265719 (Cal. Oct. 10, 2007), review granted, 172 P.3d 400 (Cal. 2007). 
210. Id.
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court could decide the case on the narrow issue of whether the trial court 
may rely upon the attorney’s unsworn representation of the client’s 
waiver of the right to a hearing, a broader consideration of the duties of 
the proposed conservatee’s counsel and of the trial court is surely 
warranted.  Stated simply, due process is not trumped by a desire to 
handle cases expeditiously.  As the California Supreme Court declared 
in Conservatorship of Roulet, “The easier the path to commitment, the 
more likely becomes the possibility of mistake.”211  In order to counteract 
potentially erroneous decisions to deprive proposed conservatees of their 
liberty and to inflict stigma upon them, the Roulet court imposed 
criminal process safeguards of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and jury 
unanimity in proceedings to establish or reestablish conservatorships.212
The possibility of an erroneous decision remains high when an attorney 
reports that his or her client waives the due process right to be present at 
the hearing and either does not contest the establishment of a new 
conservatorship or stipulates to the reestablishment of a conservatorship.  Did 
the attorney inform the client of the disabilities that could be imposed on 
him or her and that the conservatee was likely to be placed in a mental 
treatment facility where treatment would be imposed over the client’s 
objection?  Did the attorney consciously or subconsciously discourage 
the client from attending the hearing because the attorney believed the 
client would not succeed in the hearing and that it was not in the client’s 
best interests to attend?  If the client makes a competent, voluntary, and 
informed decision to waive the hearing and acquiesces in the establishment 
or reestablishment of a conservatorship, then is the client agreeing to 
accept treatment voluntarily, in which case the establishment or 
reestablishment of a conservatorship is unnecessary and an inappropriate 
involuntary commitment?  The trial court needs to consider and answer 
these questions, not avoid them in the quest for expediency. 
B.  Contested Cases 
A total of thirty-four new conservatorships were established in 
contested cases in the twenty-two court sessions, an average of 1.5 new 
conservatorships per session.  The highest number of new conservatorships 
established in contested cases in any one session was four; the lowest 
number in any one session was zero.  A total of twelve conservatorships 
were reestablished for an additional year in contested cases in the 
 211. 590 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1979). 
212. See supra text accompanying notes 140–58.  The Roulet case involved a 
proceeding to reestablish a conservatorship.  Roulet, 590 P.2d at 2.  The court applied its 
due process safeguards to all conservatorship proceedings.  Id. at 11. 
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twenty-two court sessions, an average of 0.5 reestablished conservatorships 
per session.  The highest number of conservatorships reestablished in 
contested cases in any one session was two; the lowest number in any 
one session was zero.  In one contested case, the court ruled that the 
conservatorship would not be reestablished.  This case was the only one 
of a total of forty-seven contested cases observed in this study in which 
the court ruled against the establishment or reestablishment of a 
conservatorship.  Thus, conservatorships were established or reestablished 
in 97.9% of all contested cases. 
Two other matters were considered as contested cases.  In one case, a 
conservatee petitioned the court for a rehearing as to his status as a 
conservatee.213  In this rehearing, the court held that the conservatee 
remained gravely disabled and that the conservatorship would be continued.  
However, the court also ruled that the least restrictive placement for the 
patient was a board and care facility instead of a closed, locked facility 
where the conservatee had been housed previously.214  Because this case 
did not involve the establishment of a new conservatorship or the 
reestablishment of a conservatorship that was about to expire, this case 
was not included in the study data.  The second case involved the 
establishment of a conservatorship for a criminal defendant who had 
been charged with a serious felony and found permanently incompetent 
to stand trial.  In 1974, the California Legislature enacted legislation that 
added an alternative definition of “gravely disabled” to enable a 
conservatorship to be established for such an individual.215  Because a 
213. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5364 (West 1998) (authorizing a conservatee 
to petition the superior court for a rehearing on the conservatee’s status).  Although the 
conservatee may petition the court for a rehearing at any time, if the conservatee is 
unsuccessful in the rehearing, the conservatee is not permitted to petition the court again 
for a period of six months.  Id.  In a rehearing on the conservatee’s status, SAN DIEGO
SUP. CT. R. 8.2.22(A) (adopted July 1, 2006) specifically places the burden of proof upon 
the conservatee to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the conservatee is 
no longer gravely disabled.  See supra text accompanying notes 192–93. 
214. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5358(a)(1)(A) (West 1998) (requiring the 
court to designate the least restrictive alternative placement for a conservatee). 
 215. Act of Sept. 26, 1974, ch. 1511, § 12, 1974 Cal. Stat. 3316, 3322.  As 
renumbered, and with some minor technical amendments, the statute has been codified at 
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5008(h)(1)(B) (West 1998).  The California Supreme Court 
has upheld the validity of this legislation.  Conservatorship of Hofferber, 616 P.2d 836 
(Cal. 1980).  But see Grant H. Morris & J. Reid Meloy, Out of Mind? Out of Sight: The 
Uncivil Commitment of Permanently Incompetent Criminal Defendants, 27 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1, 26–32 (1993) (strongly critiquing the 1974 legislation and the California 
Supreme Court’s decision in Hofferber).
MORRIS 7/6/2009 9:01:27 AM 
330
finding of grave disability for a permanently incompetent criminal 
defendant is not dependent upon proof of a functional inability to 
provide for food, clothing, and shelter, this case was not included in the 
study data. 
In the twenty-two court sessions, a total of 1046 minutes—17.4 
hours—was spent on contested cases—an average of forty-eight minutes 
per session and 22.3 minutes per contested case.216  The longest hearing 
lasted forty-four minutes; the shortest lasted seven minutes.  The thirty-
four hearings to establish new conservatorships averaged 23.7 minutes 
per hearing, just over five minutes longer than the 18.5 minute average 
duration of the thirteen hearings to reestablish conservatorships.217
Because the average duration of contested hearings in the 2007–2008 
study—22.3 minutes per case—is substantially longer than the average 
duration of contested hearings in the 1975 study—less than three minutes 
per case218—one might suppose that the quality of attorney representation 
of proposed conservatees today has improved significantly.  However, a 
closer examination of the cases suggests that such supposition is 
unfounded. 
In the typical contested case involving the establishment of a new 
conservatorship, County Counsel, acting on behalf of the petitioner, 
introduced into evidence the Public Conservator’s report recommending 
that a new conservatorship be established.  In the typical contested case 
involving the reestablishment of a conservatorship, County Counsel, 
acting on behalf of the petitioner, introduced into evidence the petition 
of the conservator, which included the opinion of two physicians or 
psychologists that the conservatee was still gravely disabled.219  In addition, 
in all cases, County Counsel introduced into evidence the testimony of a 
psychiatrist—either the patient’s treating doctor or a psychiatrist from 
the Forensic Psychiatry Clinic of the San Diego County Superior Court 
who examined the proposed conservatee prior to the hearing. 
In forty-three of the forty-seven cases studied, the Public Defender, 
who represented the proposed conservatee in all forty-seven cases, 
introduced into evidence the testimony of the proposed conservatee.  In 
none of the forty-seven cases studied did the Public Defender request an 
evaluation of the proposed conservatee by another psychiatrist.  In none 
 216. A total of 806 minutes was devoted to the thirty-four cases to establish a new 
conservatorship.  A total of 240 minutes was devoted to the thirteen cases to reestablish a 
conservatorship. 
 217. Both the longest hearing (forty-four minutes) and the shortest hearing (seven 
minutes) involved hearings to establish new conservatorships.  The longest hearing to 
reestablish a conservatorship was forty minutes; the shortest was nine minutes. 
218. See supra text accompanying note 136. 
 219. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5361 (West 1998). 
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of the forty-seven cases studied did the Public Defender request that the 
court appoint a psychiatrist to assist him or her in preparing for or 
conducting the hearing.  In none of the forty-seven case studied did the 
Public Defender offer the testimony of a psychiatrist to controvert the 
expert opinion of the psychiatrist who testified for the petitioner.  In only 
one of the forty-seven cases studied did the Public Defender offer the 
testimony of a family member or any other witness to support the 
proposed conservatee’s testimony that the conservatee was not gravely 
disabled and that a conservatorship was inappropriate.  In fact, in one 
case, the mother of the proposed conservatee interrupted the hearing, 
stating to the judge that she wanted the proposed conservatee to live with 
her.  The judge asked the Public Defender whether she wanted to speak 
to the mother.  The Public Defender stated that she did not wish to do so, 
but that if the judge required her to, she would.  The judge stated that she 
would not require the attorney to speak with her.  After this exchange, 
the judge allowed County Counsel to recall the psychiatrist who had 
previously testified that the proposed conservatee was gravely disabled.  
The psychiatrist stated that if the mother would take care of the proposed 
conservatee, then the proposed conservatee would not meet the standard 
of grave disability.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge ruled that 
the proposed conservatee was gravely disabled and that a conservatorship 
would be established. 
Thus, in the typical case, the only witnesses were the psychiatrist who 
examined or treated the proposed conservatee and who testified that the 
proposed conservatee was mentally disordered and met the criteria for 
grave disability, and the proposed conservatee, who testified that he or 
she was not mentally disordered or, if mentally disordered, did not meet 
the criteria for grave disability.  Although the Public Defender usually 
asked a few questions of the psychiatrist on cross-examination, the 
questions characteristically did not probe for significant weaknesses in 
the psychiatrist’s stated opinion, but rather, merely permitted the 
psychiatrist to restate his or her conclusion and to clarify or embellish 
upon the reasons for the psychiatrist’s judgment. 
Dr. Ansar Haroun, Supervisor of the Forensic Psychiatry Clinic, 
acknowledged that a psychiatrist’s opinion that a proposed conservatee 
is gravely disabled should be easily challengeable on cross-examination.220
 220. Interview with Ansar M. Haroun, M.D., Supervisor, Forensic Psychiatry Clinic 
of the San Diego County Superior Court, in San Diego, Cal. (May 29, 2008). 
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If a person has a normal ability to provide for food, clothing, and shelter, 
that person is able to provide for his or her basic needs.  If the person has 
difficulties in providing for those needs because of a mental disorder, that 
person is disabled.  Often, Dr. Haroun asserted, psychiatrists will conclude 
that the person is gravely disabled if the impairment in providing for 
basic necessities is severe.  However, to meet the statutory definition of 
“grave disability,” the person, as a result of mental disorder, must be 
unable to provide for food, clothing, or shelter.221  Inability to provide 
for basic needs means more than experiencing difficulty in providing for 
them.  If the statutory standard of “grave disability” is literally applied 
by the court, a person who is not on the verge of starving to death even 
if the person eats out of a trash can, who has at least some clothes to 
wear no matter how tattered and dirty their condition, and who knows 
enough to get out of the rain even if the person is homeless, should not 
be found to be gravely disabled.  Nevertheless, psychiatrists will express 
their opinion that a person is gravely disabled even if he or she is not 
unable to provide for food, clothing, and shelter, and lawyers for proposed 
conservatees do not challenge those opinions on cross-examination. 
Because, in the typical case, the judge only heard the testimony of the 
psychiatrist—with no effective cross-examination by the Public 
Defender—and the testimony of the proposed conservatee, the results of 
the hearings could easily be anticipated.  In forty-six of the forty-seven 
contested cases—97.9% of the cases studied—the court ruled in favor of 
the petitioner and ordered that the conservatorship be established or 
reestablished.222
In the hearings, the Public Defender rarely questioned whether 
disabilities223 should be imposed on the proposed conservatee if the 
court should decide to order that a conservatorship be established or 
reestablished.  In only three of the forty-seven cases did the Public Defender 
challenge either the potential loss of the proposed conservatee’s 
privilege of possessing a license to operate a motor vehicle or the 
proposed conservatee’s right to refuse or consent to routine medical 
treatment unrelated to the person’s condition of grave disability.  In only 
two of the forty-seven cases did the Public Defender challenge the 
221. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5008(h)(1)(A) (West 1998). 
 222. In the one case in which the judge ruled that a conservatorship would not be 
reestablished, the individual testified that he currently takes his medication because it 
makes him feel better and improves his sleep and his mood, and that he attends a day 
program and will continue to attend that program to help him in dealing with problems 
he has with his mental illness.  The patient also submitted a letter outlining his housing 
arrangements and future plans. 
223. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5357 (West 1998) (identifying the disabilities 
that can be imposed on a conservatee). 
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potential loss of the proposed conservatee’s right to enter into contracts, 
the potential conservatee’s right to vote, or the proposed conservatee’s 
right to refuse or consent to treatment related specifically to the 
proposed conservatee’s condition of grave disability.  In none of the 
forty-seven cases did the Public Defender challenge the potential loss of 
the proposed conservatee’s right to possess a firearm. 
In all forty-six cases in which a conservatorship was established or 
reestablished—100% of the cases—the court imposed all of the 
following disabilities on the conservatee: loss of driver’s license, loss of 
the right to enter into contracts, loss of the right to refuse or consent to 
treatment related specifically to the conservatee’s condition of grave 
disability, loss of the right to refuse or consent to routine medical 
treatment unrelated to the person’s condition of grave disability, and loss 
of the proposed conservatee’s right to possess a firearm.  In sharp 
contrast, the court disqualified the conservatee from voting in only three 
of the forty-six cases—only 6.5% of the cases in which a conservatorship 
was established.  Typically, the testifying psychiatrist would simply state 
that the conservatee was able to complete a voter registration form or 
could identify the President and thus should not be disqualified from 
voting.  Dr. Haroun informed me that his predecessor as Supervisor of 
the Forensic Psychiatry Clinic had expressed concern that efforts to 
disqualify conservatees from voting might be challenged by the American 
Civil Liberties Union, and that to avoid such potential litigation, 
psychiatrists working in the Forensic Clinic should not seek to impose 
this disability.224  This informal policy continues to be employed.  Thus, 
psychiatrists in the Forensic Clinic typically seek to have all statutory 
disabilities imposed except disqualification from voting, and the court 
typically imposes all disabilities except disqualification from voting.  
This disparity suggests that individual cases are not being separately 
considered on their merits, but rather, are processed as a routine matter 
with anticipated, if not predetermined, results. 
The failure of the Public Defender to advocate effectively that the 
proposed conservatee should be permitted to retain various rights surely 
contributed to the court’s decision to remove those rights when the 
conservatorship was established or reestablished.  The unchallenged loss 
of the conservatee’s right to refuse or consent to treatment related to the 
 224. Interview with Ansar M. Haroun, M.D., Supervisor, Forensic Psychiatry Clinic 
of the San Diego County Superior Court, in San Diego, Cal. (May 29, 2008). 
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conservatee’s condition of grave disability is especially troubling.  A 
judge’s decision that the proposed conservatee is gravely disabled and 
that a conservatorship be established or reestablished is not, in and of 
itself, an adjudication that the conservatee is mentally incompetent 
generally or lacks the capacity to make treatment decisions.225  The court 
is required to “mak[e] appropriate findings” in order to deny the conservatee 
the right to give or withhold consent to treatment for the conservatee’s 
condition.226  Substantial evidence of a conservatee’s competence to 
make treatment decisions may be available in some, and perhaps many, 
cases.  For example, in a study of mental patient decisionmaking, the 
most frequently cited reason by patients for refusing medication was side 
effects experienced from previous administration of that medication.227
Psychotropic medications are powerful drugs that may produce 
temporary and permanent side effects that are discomforting,228 painful,229
disabling,230 and even deadly.231  Even the newer atypical antipsychotic 
medications, such as Clozaril, Resperidal, and Zyprexa, increase a patient’s 
225. See supra text accompanying notes 120–21. 
 226. Riese v. St. Mary’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 204 (Ct. App. 
1987).
 227. Morris, supra note 107, at 404. 
 228. Sedation is a common non-neurological side effect of psychotropic medication.  
Sedated patients experience drowsiness and fatigue.  Cichon, supra note 63, at 297.  
Other non-neurological side effects include anticholinergic disturbances such as blurred 
vision, dry mouth, urinary retention, and constipation.  Id. at 297–98. 
 229. Akathisia is an extrapyramidal side effect of psychotropic medication.  Akathisia 
“is characterized by a painful irritability and a persistent desire to move.  Symptoms can 
include a constant tapping of feet, alteration of posture and shifting of legs, fidgeting, 
pacing, and an inability to feel comfortable in any position.”  Id. at 301 (footnote omitted).  
Dystonias are another extrapyramidal side effect.  “Dystonic reactions often involve 
acute and very painful spasms of muscle groups including those in the neck, face, eyes, 
pelvis, trunk, and the extremities.”  Id. at 303. 
 230. Tardive dyskinesia is a side effect of psychotropic medication that is 
characterized by “uncontrollable repetitive movements principally affecting the face, 
tongue, mouth, trunk (including respiratory muscles), upper and lower extremities, neck, 
shoulders, and pelvis.  In the more pronounced cases, patients may have difficulty in 
swallowing (resulting in weight loss), talking, and breathing . . . .”  Id. at 304.  Parkinsonism 
is an extrapyramidal side effect of psychotropic medication.  “Its symptoms include a 
mask-like face, tremors of the limbs, muscle rigidity, spasms, drooling, a stooped and 
shuffling gait, and a general slowing of motor responses.”  Id. at 300.  Akinesia is a 
subcategory of Parkinsonism, “characterized by a decrease in spontaneous mobility and 
speech along with a general feeling of listlessness and apathy.”  Id. at 301.  Other 
disabling side effects include obstructed vision, blindness, and sexual dysfunction.  Id. at 
298, 303. 
 231. Neuroleptic malignant syndrome is a side effect of psychotropic medication.  
Its symptoms include “hyperthermia (fever), severe skeletal rigidity, elevated blood 
pressure, tachycardia, and alterations in consciousness including delirium, mutism, 
stupor, and coma. . . .  This disorder is fatal in twenty to thirty percent of the cases . . . .”  
Id. at 308 (citation omitted).  Dyscrasias are potentially fatal blood disorders that may 
occur as side effects of psychotropic medication.  Id. at 298–99. 
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risk of diabetes, obesity, and heart disease.232  Although competent 
decisionmaking requires the individual to weigh the potential benefits of 
a proposed medication as well as the risks, nevertheless, a patient’s 
concern about side effects—particularly if those side effects have been 
experienced previously—may be a rational basis for that patient to 
refuse administration of that medication.  Some treating psychiatrists, 
however, do not consider mental patients’ concerns about side effects in 
assessing their competence to refuse medication.  When psychiatrists 
make a professional judgment that a medication is medically appropriate 
to treat the patient’s disorder, they often view any patient objections as 
irrational.233
Additionally, many psychiatrists do not provide mental patients with 
needed information about medication side effects and treatment alternatives 
to the medication they are prescribing.234  One study reported that the failure 
of psychiatrists to inform patients was not limited to a few isolated 
incidents, but rather, was pervasive.235  When psychiatrists withhold or 
otherwise manipulate236 information about risks and alternatives, they 
232. Consensus Development Conference on Antipsychotic Drugs and Obesity and 
Diabetes, 27 DIABETES CARE 596, 597–98, 600 (2004).  Participants in the conference 
included the American Diabetes Association, the American Psychiatric Association, the 
North American Association for the Study of Obesity, and the American Association of 
Clinical Endocrinologists.  Id. at 596. 
 233. Similarly, psychiatrists are also too quick to claim that a patient’s denial that 
he or she has a mental disorder determines the patient’s incapacity to make treatment 
decisions.  Sometimes a patient’s seemingly irrational objections to medication are, in 
fact, rationally based.  For example, does the patient who appears to deny a mental 
disorder acknowledge in nonmedical terms that the patient is experiencing a problem?  Is 
the patient denying mental disorder in order to maintain control over his or her life and to 
avoid being thrust into the dependent role of a mental patient?  Is the patient denying 
mental disorder because the patient has experienced medication side effects previously 
and is more concerned about those effects than the therapeutic potential of the 
medication?  Is the denial an attempt to avoid a catch-22 situation, that is, by admitting 
mental disorder the patient strengthens the psychiatrist’s assertion that medication is the 
appropriate remedy?  Is the patient’s hostility toward the psychiatrist a rational reaction 
either to the patient’s involuntary detention or to the lack of communication between the 
psychiatrist and the patient? 
234. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 107, at 425–29. 
235. Id. at 429. 
 236. Examples of manipulation include informing patients only about medication 
benefits; or discussing risks only in general terms, informing patients only that any 
medication can have detrimental as well as beneficial effects; or discussing some lesser, 
non-neurological side effects, such as sedation, dry mouth, blurred vision, urinary 
retention, and constipation, but omitting any discussion of neurological side effects such 
as dystonia, Parkinsonism, akathisia, akinesia, and tardive dyskinesia.  Id. at 426–27. 
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undermine their patients’ abilities to make competent decisions.237
To obtain a competent patient’s informed consent, the California Supreme 
Court requires doctors to divulge “all information relevant to a meaningful 
decisional process.”238  Psychiatrists should not be allowed to circumvent 
their disclosure obligation by asserting that whenever a patient refuses 
prescribed medication, that patient lacks the capacity to make treatment 
decisions.
In the hearings observed in this study, the psychiatrist’s judgment that 
the proposed conservatee should lose the right to make treatment 
decisions regarding the proposed conservatee’s mental disorder was not 
challenged by the Public Defender.  Was the patient refusing medication 
because of a rational concern about side effects?  Did the psychiatrist 
fulfill the psychiatrist’s disclosure obligation to fully inform the patient 
about side effects that may be experienced?  These issues were not 
addressed in cross-examination.  They should have been. 
The failure of the Public Defender to contest the imposition of the 
treatment decisionmaking disability on his or her client cannot be 
justified.  The deprivation of liberty that occurs when that right is lost is 
truly significant.  In all forty-six cases in which the court abrogated the 
conservatee’s right to make treatment decisions, the court transferred 
that decisionmaking authority to the conservator.239 In all forty-six cases, 
the court specifically granted the conservator the authority to place the 
conservatee in a mental hospital or other treatment facility240 and to 
require the conservatee to receive treatment for his or her mental disorder.241
From the conservatee’s perspective, the government’s unwanted assistance 
 237. John S. Carroll, Consent to Mental Health Treatment: A Theoretical Analysis 
of Coercion, Freedom, and Control, 9 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 129, 132 (1991); see also Loren 
H. Roth, The Right to Refuse Psychiatric Treatment: Law and Medicine at the Interface,
35 EMORY L.J. 139, 143 (1986) (“Information is given to patients largely to achieve their 
compliance, not to involve the patient in decision making.”).  To make a competent 
decision, a patient must analyze relevant information in terms of the patient’s own knowledge, 
beliefs, and goals.  Carroll, supra, at 132. 
 238. Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1972).  The court summarized the physician’s 
disclosure duty as follows: 
In sum, the patient’s right of self-decision is the measure of the physician’s 
duty to reveal.  That right can be effectively exercised only if the patient possesses 
adequate information to enable an intelligent choice.  The scope of the physician’s 
communications to the patient, then, must be measured by the patient’s need, 
and that need is whatever information is material to the decision.  Thus the test 
for determining whether a potential peril must be divulged is its materiality to 
the patient’s decision. 
Id. at 11. 
 239. In only eight of the forty-six cases did the Public Defender challenge the transfer of 
the conservatee’s treatment decisionmaking authority to the conservator. 
 240. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5358(a)(1), (2) (West 1998). 
241. Id. § 5358(b). 
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resulted in the conservatee’s involuntary confinement and coerced 
treatment. 
VII. ZEALOUS ADVOCACY FOR MENTALLY DISORDERED CLIENTS:
REALITY OR DELUSION?
In 1979, the California Supreme Court imposed a requirement of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt and jury unanimity in proceedings to establish 
mental health conservatorships.242  The court did so, in part, because 
of “the paternalistic attitude of some appointed counsel”243 in representing 
proposed conservatees.  Despite the court’s decision, the recent study of 
attorney performance in conservatorship cases reveals that the paternalistic 
attitude of counsel representing proposed conservatees has not changed.  
Paternalism existed thirty years ago; paternalism persists today. 
In the article reporting on the 1975 study of conservatorship hearings 
in San Diego County, I recommended that instead of “using large 
numbers of private practitioners who handle conservatorship cases only 
sporadically, consideration should be given to creating a full-time 
conservatee attorney service.”244  I cited approvingly the public defender 
model employing a small group of attorneys who would develop expertise 
in preparing and presenting cases and who would “pursue those cases 
with appropriate dedication.”245  But I was wrong.246  Although a small 
group of attorneys from the Office of the Public Defender now represents 
proposed conservatees in conservatorship hearings in San Diego County, 
the recent study reveals that cases are not pursued by those attorneys 
with appropriate dedication.  Although replacing occasional counsel 
with organized and regularized counsel is an important prerequisite to 
adequate representation of mentally disordered clients, such reform does 
 242. Conservatorship of Roulet, 590 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 1979).  See supra text accompanying 
notes 140–58 (discussing Roulet). 
243. Roulet, 590 P.2d at 11. 
 244. Morris, supra note 93, at 237. 
245. Id.
 246. In defense of my proposal, I note that I included in my recommendation that 
this small group of attorneys representing proposed conservatees would “have adequate 
psychiatric and social work services to assist them.”  Id.  The attorneys from the Office 
of the Public Defender who represent proposed conservatees in San Diego County do not 
have, and have not requested, that needed assistance. 
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not ensure that paternalism will be replaced with zealous advocacy.247
What is needed is a change in attitude. 
When the government seeks to civilly commit a mentally disordered 
individual, the role of the attorney is to zealously advocate for that 
individual in an attempt to prevent the loss of the client’s liberty.  After 
all, detention of the individual through civil commitment is an involuntary 
detention.  When the government seeks to determine that the mentally 
disordered individual is incapable of making treatment decisions regarding 
his or her disorder, the role of the attorney is to zealously advocate for that 
individual in an attempt to prevent the loss of the client’s right to make 
autonomous treatment decisions.  After all, treatment of the individual 
without his or her consent is involuntary treatment.  When the government 
seeks to establish a conservatorship for a mentally disordered individual 
in order to empower a conservator to place the conservatee in a mental 
hospital or other mental treatment facility and require the conservatee to 
accept treatment for the conservatee’s mental disorder, the role of the 
attorney is to zealously advocate for that individual in an attempt to 
prevent the involuntary detention and involuntary treatment of the client. 
Lawyers are charged with protecting their client’s legal rights,248 not 
with acquiescing in governmental attempts to deprive their client of 
those rights in order to provide unwanted assistance that will, in the 
government’s view, benefit the client.  As aptly stated by the Montana 
Supreme Court in In re Mental Health of K.G.F.:249
 247. Michael Perlin has repeatedly urged the use of organized and regularized 
counsel for mentally disabled persons in civil commitment hearings and in hearings to 
determine a mental patient’s treatment decisionmaking capacity.  See, e.g., 1 PERLIN,
supra note 2, § 2B-4, at 214 (“[I]t appears beyond dispute that an organized and 
regularized scheme for providing such counsel comes closest to guaranteeing at least 
minimally adequate counsel.”).  By comparison, Perlin states, “The track record for 
‘occasional’ counsel continues to be shoddy.”  Id. § 2B-6, at 222.  He notes, however, that 
although some public defender “programs have traditionally provided effective legal services 
to persons with mental disabilities, the track record of others has been, to be charitable, 
mixed.” Id. § 2B-5, at 216–17 (footnotes omitted).  See also Andalman & Chambers, 
supra note 32, at 62 (reporting that the Public Defender in Chicago who represented 
mentally disordered persons in civil commitment hearings “did advocate [for] the release 
of his clients, though he appeared to press less vigorously for those clients whom he 
believed needed hospitalization, even if the client wanted her freedom”). 
248. See, e.g., In re Conservatorship of Christopher A., 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 427, 433 
(Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Linsk v. Linsk, 449 P.2d 760, 764 (Cal. 1969)).  See supra text 
accompanying note 187. 
 249. 29 P.3d 485 (Mont. 2001). 
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[W]e must . . . be cautious and critical of signs of paternalism legitimized by the 
parens patriae doctrine, where State actors purport to have an absolute 
understanding of what is in the best interests of an individual, whose liberty, 
dignity and privacy are at issue, and whose voice is muted by the swift and 
overriding authority of court-appointed professionals.250
If we truly believe that lawyers today are doing an adequate job in 
representing their mentally disordered clients—if we are willing to 
accept that belief as our reality—then we are deluding ourselves.251  In 
focusing on the question of whether a mental patient had received 
effective assistance of counsel in a civil commitment proceeding, the 
Montana Supreme Court proclaimed that the involuntary civil commitment 
hearing process is an “obvious systemic failure . . . .  [T]he ordinary course of 
the efficient administration of a legal process threatens to supplant an 
individual’s due process rights that serve to safeguard . . . fundamental 
liberty interests . . . .”252  The court characterized a civil commitment 
hearing as “a proceeding that routinely accepts—and even requires—an 
unreasonably low standard of legal assistance and generally disdains 
zealous, adversarial confrontation.”253
The Montana Supreme Court did more than merely indict lawyers who 
represent mentally disordered clients in civil commitment proceedings and 
judges who condone—and even encourage—ineffective assistance of 
counsel in those proceedings.  The court adopted specific guidelines for 
lawyers to ensure that mentally disordered clients receive effective 
assistance of counsel in civil commitment proceedings.254  For example, 
to be eligible for appointment, attorneys are required to “have 
specialized course training, or have received supervised on-the-job 
training in the duties, skills, and ethics of representing civil commitment 
250. Id. at 496. 
 251. A delusion is defined as “a false, persistent belief not substantiated by sensory 
or objective evidence.”  WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN 
LANGUAGE, supra note 6, at 374. 
252. K.G.F., 29 P.3d at 494. 
253. Id. at 492.  In describing the existing “perfunctory process” of a civil 
commitment hearing, the court acknowledged, “[O]ur legal system of judges, lawyers, 
and clinicians has seemingly lost its way in vigilantly protecting the fundamental rights 
of [mentally disordered] individuals.”  Id. at 493. 
254. Id. at 497.  The court adopted, and expanded upon, guidelines for legal 
representation in civil commitment proceedings developed and promulgated by the 
National Center for State Courts.  See National Center for State Courts, Guidelines for 
Involuntary Civil Commitment, 10 A.B.A. MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 409, 
464–91 (1986) (parts E and F) [hereinafter Guidelines]. 
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respondents.”255  Counsel for a mentally disordered client is expected to 
“conduct a thorough review of all available records”256 and be “prepared 
to discuss with his or her client the available options in light of such 
investigations.”257  Counsel is required to meet with his or her client and 
“[t]he initial client interview should be conducted in private and should 
be held sufficiently before any scheduled hearings to permit effective 
preparation and prehearing assistance to the client.”258  Counsel is required 
“to facilitate the exercise of the client’s right . . . to ‘be examined by a 
professional person of the person’s choice.’”259  Most importantly, the 
court stated “that the proper role of the attorney is to ‘represent the 
perspective of the [client] and to serve as a vigorous advocate for the 
[client’s] wishes.’”260 Lest there be any doubt, the court added: “In the 
courtroom, an attorney should engage in all aspects of advocacy and 
vigorously argue to the best of his or her ability for the ends desired by 
the client.”261  If counsel independently advocates for, or acquiesces in 
involuntary commitment—absent a voluntary and knowing consent by 
the patient—such conduct “will establish the presumption that counsel 
was ineffective.”262
The data from the recent study of conservatorship proceedings in San 
Diego County support a similar presumption of counsel ineffectiveness 
in those proceedings.  In 238 cases, counsel for the proposed conservatee 
either did not contest the establishment of a conservatorship or stipulated 
to the reestablishment of a conservatorship.263 During those same 
proceedings, the establishment or reestablishment of a conservatorship 
was contested in only forty-seven cases.  Thus, counsel for the proposed 
conservatee either acquiesced in, or independently advocated for, a 
conservatorship in 83.5% of the 285 cases. 
The data also confirm that the conservatorship hearing process, just as 
the civil commitment process in Montana, is an “obvious systemic 
255. K.G.F., 29 P.3d at 498. 
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 499 (emphasis omitted). 
259. Id. (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-115(9) (2007) and citing id. § 53-21-
124(3)).
260. K.G.F., 29 P.3d at 500 (quoting Guidelines, supra note 254, at 465).  If the 
client is unwilling or unable to express his or her personal wishes, “the attorney should 
advocate the position that best safeguards and advances the client’s interest.”  Id. 
(quoting Guidelines, supra note 254, at 465).  The Guidelines specifically identify the 
client’s interest “in liberty” as the interest that should be safeguarded and advanced by 
the attorney.  Guidelines, supra note 254, at 466. 
261. K.G.F., 29 P.3d at 500 (quoting Guidelines, supra note 254, at 483). 
262. Id.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 182–212. 
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failure”264 “that routinely accepts—and even requires—an unreasonably 
low standard of legal assistance and generally disdains zealous, adversarial 
confrontation.”265  Even when counsel for proposed conservatees “contested” 
the establishment or reestablishment of a conservatorship, they typically 
engaged in no probing cross-examination of the psychiatrist who 
testified in favor of the conservatorship and for the imposition of 
disabilities being imposed on their client if a conservatorship was 
established or reestablished.266  They did not introduce the testimony of 
a psychiatrist, a family member, or a friend to counter that of the 
psychiatrist who testified in favor of the conservatorship.  The only 
witness called by counsel for the proposed conservatee was the proposed 
conservatee himself or herself.267  Leading a lamb to the slaughter does 
not constitute zealous advocacy on behalf of the lamb.268  When trial 
judges tolerate—and even encourage—this unreasonably low standard 
of legal assistance, they undermine the proposed conservatee’s right to 
effective assistance of counsel in the adversarial process that is required 
before society deprives a person of liberty and of basic human rights, 
including the right to medical self-determination.269
In re Mental Health of K.G.F. was—or should have been—a landmark 
decision.  However, in the eight years since the case was decided, it has 
only been cited on the competency of counsel issue in two appellate 
court cases—and both cases cited K.G.F. negatively.  In 2004, the Court 
of Appeals of Washington disagreed with the Montana Supreme Court’s 
refusal to presume the effectiveness of counsel in civil commitment 
proceedings, stating: “We do not share the Montana Supreme Court’s 
dim view of the quality of civil commitment proceedings . . . in the state 
of Washington.”270  In 2006, the Ohio Court of Appeals, citing the 
 264. Quoting from K.G.F., 29 P.3d at 494. 
265. Id. at 492. 
266. See supra text accompanying notes 220–21 (reporting on Dr. Haroun’s suggested, 
but unused, method of cross-examining psychiatrists who testify that a proposed conservatee 
is gravely disabled and that a conservatorship should be established or reestablished). 
267. See supra text following note 220. 
268. See Isaiah 53:7 (“As a lamb that is led to the slaughter . . . .”). 
269. See supra text accompanying notes 159–64 (discussing the requirement of 
effective assistance of counsel in conservatorship proceedings).  The data from the recent 
study of conservatorship proceedings in San Diego County demonstrate that the 
performance of counsel for proposed conservatees falls below the objective standard of 
reasonably effective assistance of criminal defense counsel established by the United 
States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984). 
270. In re T.A. H.-L., 97 P.3d 767, 771 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). 
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Washington Court of Appeals decision, declined to follow K.G.F., stating: 
“Likewise, we do not share the Supreme Court of Montana’s view . . . .”271
Apparently, in Washington, Ohio, and in most of the United States, a 
lawyer who acquiesces in or advocates for the involuntary commitment 
of his or her client, or for requiring the client to accept medication that 
he or she does not wish to take, or for imposing a conservatorship that 
will allow the conservator to “volunteer” the client for placement in a 
mental treatment facility and to authorize unwanted treatment, will not 
be presumed to be providing ineffective assistance of counsel.  The failure 
of appellate courts throughout the United States to demand zealous 
advocacy by attorneys for their mentally disordered clients suggests that 
paternalism does not merely persist, but rather, that paternalism prevails. 
Most persons, upon observing The Rocky Horror Picture Show,
consider the highlight of that cult movie classic to be the performance of 
“The Time Warp,” a marvelous song and dance number.  The lyrics of 
that song contain two distinct references to mental disorder: “Madness 
takes its toll,” and “[I]t’s the pelvic thrust that really drives you 
insane.”272  The lyrics contain one reference to treatment of mental 
illness: “You’re spaced out on sensation, like you’re under sedation.”273
And the lyrics contain one reference to the meaningless passage of time: 
“Time meant nothing, never would again.”274  Most lawyers, in representing a 
mentally disordered client in proceedings to determine whether civil 
commitment is warranted, in proceedings to impose treatment over the 
client’s objection, and in proceedings to establish a mental health 
conservatorship, perform as inadequately as lawyers performed thirty or 
forty years ago.  Unless lawyers are required to act as zealous advocates 
for their clients, they will be guided only by the song’s oft repeated 
refrain: “Let’s do the Time Warp again!”275
271. In re L.G., No. 06AP-453, 2006 WL 2780157, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 28, 
2006).  In the only other appellate court decision citing K.G.F., the Supreme Court of 
Montana distinguished the case on the question of whether the trial court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction because the issues were moot.  In re R.E.A., 127 P.3d 517, 519 
(Mont. 2006). 
 272. The Time Warp, in THE ROCKY HORROR PICTURE SHOW (1975), available at 
SLL Lyrics, http://www.stlyrics.com/lyrics/therockyhorrorpictureshow/thetimewarp.htm 
(last visited Apr. 2, 2009). 
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.  “The Time Warp” is a most appropriate song for this Article.  As I wrote in 
the introduction to this Article, when I observed the inadequate performance of attorneys 
in conservatorship hearings in December of 2007 and the spring of 2008, I felt that I had 
entered a time warp—I was transported back to 1975, observing the inadequate 
performance of attorneys in conservatorship hearings that I had observed more than thirty 
years earlier.  The Rocky Picture Horror Show, the movie that contains this song, was first 
released in 1975. 
